Date: Tue, 5 Mar 96 8:12:52 EST From: DONALD CARLUCCI Subject: France 1940 Guys, Jumping in on the 1940 campaign discussion, my thoughts are that I would rather see the units rated by "tube counting" rather than any other method. Idiot rules could always be applied to simulate Allied command, control, doctrine and morale effects. My reasons for this are twofold. First, if an Idiot rule doesn't work or evolves over time, it can be modified without changes to the unit counters. Second, a great way to simulate doctrine changes, "battle hardening" or exper- ience would be to slowly relax the rules. The French seemed to fight better as the campaign wore on and had the encirclement not thrown them into such disarray, I think the campaign would have lasted longer if not to the end of the war. As a side note, if Europa ever explores variant situations, on simple one would be to have the French have as good a command and control as the Germans. Just a thought. Later. DonC. Date: Tue, 05 Mar 96 06:44:04 PST From: "Renaud.Gary" Subject: supply & major offensives Mr. Ljungberg, "1) ...prevent the whole ...Force to continually attack with every unit ..." Absolutely. "2) We want to introduce a measure of pre-planning of major offensives." What is a "major" offensive? Is that ANY offensive large enough to show up at Europa scale? Or is it a certain number of divisions? I would have to see how much additional burden this is going to add to my playing time. "In addition, it could be possible to model major offensives by, for example, giving a HQ two LPs for a turn, which would then give all attacks a +1 DRM." I don't understand what this represents. I'm not trying to argue, but asking for information to cure my ignorance. Exactly what is happening to produce that "+1?" More assets? Extra ammo? More careful logistics and planning? A Renaud.Gary@Corona.Navy.Mil This graphic is |\ CompuServe: 73627,1114 a LOT smaller | \ _,,,---,,__ Genie: G.Renaud1 than a PGP key /,`.-'`' -. ;-;,---__ (909)273-5378 block __|,4- ) )-,_. ,\ ( `'==--' (714)750-9243 `-----''(_/--' `-'\_) DNRC Holder of Past Knowledge I CAN'T speak for this administration; I tell the truth. Date: Tue, 5 Mar 96 15:52:29 +0100 From: peterlj@smab.se (Peter Ljungberg) Subject: Re: supply Nice to see the supply discussion continuingp. Unfortunately I deleted Elias reply, but I'll try to adress some of his points anyway: One of Elias points against my suggestion (which is, of course, not my idea but taken from TEM. Credit where credit is due) is that it`s not `simple` because it introduces new concepts (active/inactive HQs etc. I agree that the concepts of HQs is new, but not that the use of the old attack supply points is simpler, just because it`s an old idea. Personally, I do NOT want to count the number of REs attacking between Murmansk and Rostov, divide by ten and then deduct that number of attack points. I`d rather count the number of attacks within a certain radius from a HQ instead, which to me is quicker. I do NOT want to try to estimate if I need attack supply for 50 RE, or 100 RE or 150 RE for my attack on Moscow, only that it would mean about 7 attacks -> two armies (or whatever). To me, it is simpler to decide which armies or fronts should be put into attack supply than try to decide to within tens of RE how large forces are to attack in certain areas. I guess I`m just lazy. Of course, one could instead have one attack per attack supply point, and move these supply points around without any HQs. More like the old system. Still, in some way, it appeals more to me to plan a Soviet winter offensive by deciding to activate the First Ukrainian front in Dec I than to move 10 supply points to Poltava. Outrunning of supply lines can also be modeled using HQs, either according to my proposition or when using supply points. Just limit the ability of a HQ to provide support after moving. This also gives a chance to factor in national abilities - some nations would be able to move their HQs farther than others. But this should not be made too complex - keep it simple. Special rules for the arctic and desert is nothing peculiar to this suggestion - it`s already there in WD, FiTe etc. My point: we don`t have to cling to a cumbersome system just because it`s been used before. If introducing one or more concepts makes things simpler, then I'm for it. Of course, since these ideas are not my own, I`m very open to other points of view.... A bit unorganised, but I hope you get my points! For those interested in the details, I recommend picking up the Clash of Titans TEM and having a look. In my opinion, there are several good ideas there. Cheers! Peter Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 10:17:27 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: France Falls Again > Dave Lippman > Public Affairs Officer > US Naval Antarctic Support Unit > Christchurch, New Zealand > Still, the question remains, what if Reynaud had appointed De Gaulle >as defense minister vice Petain, putting a more fiery leader at the top. >The creation of Vichy France was not a done deal. I'd like to see options >aweigh in the case of the fall of France. The collapse of France and the creation of Vichy had a lot to do with the immense shock of the German success -- within the first month of active operations, the cream of the French army was lost and Paris was on the verge of capture. Had the campaign been longer and harder fought, the French government would have most likely stiffened its resolve and continued the fight. For example, had the French staved off the initially Ardennes breakthrough, but the Germans managed to grind down the French and capture Paris at the end of a 6-month campaign, it is unlikely the French government would have given in so easily. Accordingly, the factors that will cause the French to seek an armistice have to include: * the speed in which the Germans capture French major cities (with Paris counting for the most) -- the faster, the more likely an armistice. * the amount of losses suffered by the French -- the heavier they are, the more likely likely an armistice. * the amount of losses inflicted on the Germans -- if the French know the Germans are suffering heavily, they may be more inclined to stay at it. * possibly, the degree of British help -- the fewer British forces on the continent, the more likely the French will decide to stop "fighting the war alone." * other factors, such as what the Soviet Union is doing. At some point, if the Germans do well enough, they will force the French to take an armistice check, and the above factors will influence the check (such as being die roll modifiers). As I see it, the range of possibilities include: 1) No Surrender. France does not seek an armistice with the Axis, and will continue to fighting even if driven out of metropolitan France. 2) Armistice/Weak Vichy, Strong Free French. France seeks an armistice with the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, but remains largely hostile to the Germans and anti-collaborationist. There's a strong Free French movement, and French overseas possessions are likely to join the Free French. 3) Armistice/Vichy, Free French. France seeks an armistice with the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, and is somewhat collaborationist with the Axis. There's a Free French movement, which remains anemic as long as Vichy is seen as the legitimate government of France, and French overseas possessions are unlikely to join the Free French. (This is the historical outcome). 4) Armistice/Strong Vichy, Weak Free French. France seeks an armistice with the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, and is collaborationist with the Axis, especially once the Axis goes to war with the USSR. There's a very weak Free French movement (essentially a British propaganda ploy), and French overseas possessions will not join the Free French. Now, arranging the armistice looks to be a three step process. First, check to see if France will seek an armistice or not. Second, without determining which of the three flavors of armistice will be in force, check to see if the Germans will accept or decline the armistice. If they decline, France automatically goes to "No Surrender." Third, if the Germans accept an armistice, determine which flavor of armistice it is. From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue) Subject: supply, TEM Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 11:21:58 -0500 (EST) Hi, I'm happy to see all of this discussion on HQs. I do think that some system involving HQs might make the supply system both more realistic and simpler (at least simpler than the detailed supply systems in some of the smaller games.) What is the latest TEM? Is that the "Clash of Titans" issue? What number is it? Best Wishes, Keith Pardue Kingston, Ontario, Canada Date: Tue, 5 Mar 96 12:36:26 EST From: "Frank E. Watson" Subject: re:supply, TEM > What is the latest TEM? Is that the "Clash of Titans" issue? > What number is it? General TEM information. I live in Virginia so I can't say when these should reach non-US locations. I have no idea. TEM 43/44. "Clash of the Titans" aka 1943 linking scenario. Theoretically a double issue but mailed as two separate mailings. Received mine some time back. TEM 45 "Battle for Rome" says "Liberation" on the cover. Got mine in mail about 3 weeks ago. TEM 46 "Finland in WWII" issue. At the printer's. Last issue of 95 issue year. TEM 47 Rick is/was finishing up last week. 1st Issue of 96 issue year. TEM 48 Sicily. Work continues but nearing completion. Famous last words. TEM 49 Naval issue. Exact contents TBD. Date: Tue, 5 Mar 96 12:46:03 EST From: "Frank E. Watson" Subject: re:supply & major offensives >> "In addition, it could be possible to model major offensives by, for example, >> giving a HQ two LPs for a turn, which would then give all attacks a +1 DRM." > I don't understand what this represents. I'm not trying to argue, but > asking for information to cure my ignorance. Exactly what is happening to > produce that "+1?" More assets? Extra ammo? More careful logistics and > planning? I would say that a +1 represents careful logistics and planning. Rehearsals, laying down tape to guide units in night attacks. Better coordination. Extra ammo too, but that might be better simulated by giving a multiplier for artillery units as several battle scenarios have done (Kiev for one). What a +1 does is give a reason to wait and stockpile supplies. This is not a perfect solution by far. There are several arguments pro and con but I don't have time to dwell on it right now. Heading for the airport, Frank From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 08:30 GMT Subject: Re: France Falls Again Dear John: Your plans for handling the collapse of France look eminently sensible to me. Looks like you've pretty much based on the actual factors that were at work both externally (Germany battering France) and internally (the strength and weakness of the French government. Most of the swift collapse of the Third Republic seems to be the result of the sheer shock and violence of the German assault...in a week, the French and British armies were completely defeated...combined with the flabbiness of the French leadership. But it looks like you have a handle on it. Best, Dave Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 08:37 GMT Subject: France and Italy True enough, the Italian front was a ghastly mess. I've just been reading about the invasion of Salerno, and the battle of Cassino. Cassino is of great interest here in New Zealand, because 2nd NZ Division fought in that one, taking a fearful pounding. Sometimes I think the only battles worth fighting are cardboard ones. Best, Dave Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 15:17:43 -0500 From: "Don E. Carlucci" Subject: Fall Of France Counter sheets Guys, Since we are on a FoF topic, it seems like a good time to ask this question. Does anyone know what was on each numbered counter sheet in FoF? I had purchased an extra set and GRD was out of one sheet (I don't remember which one) and I am curious as to which units I am missing. Any help would be appreciated. Thanks. Don C. Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 15:35:07 -0500 (EST) From: Courtenay Footman Subject: Supply While I agree that in theory something should be done about supply (the argument about the 44-45 red army is compelling), I want to point out that other things would have to change for this to work. In particular, something would have to be done about the "non-over- runable double line" of defense. I find that typical attacks, particularly in FiTE, are already much slower than historical, because of the NODL's. Grand pockets simply do not occur. So I feel that supply should only be changed in conjunction with some changes allowing a front to be broken. Actually, supply rules should aid this change, otherwise it would be very difficult to make a change to the attack rules balanced. (The lack of specifics in this note is deliberate!) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Courtenay Footman I have again gotten back on the net, and cpf@lightlink.com again I will never get anything done. Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 22:40:48 +0100 From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland) Subject: Re: France Falls Again John Astell wrote: >The collapse of France and the creation of Vichy had a lot to do with the >immense shock of the German success -- within the first month of active >operations, the cream of the French army was lost and Paris was on the >verge of capture. Had the campaign been longer and harder fought, the >French government would have most likely stiffened its resolve and >continued the fight. For example, had the French staved off the initially >Ardennes breakthrough, but the Germans managed to grind down the French and >capture Paris at the end of a 6-month campaign, it is unlikely the French >government would have given in so easily. Accordingly, the factors that >will cause the French to seek an armistice have to include: > etc. > >Now, arranging the armistice looks to be a three step process. First, check >to see if France will seek an armistice or not. Second, without determining >which of the three flavors of armistice will be in force, check to see if >the Germans will accept or decline the armistice. If they decline, France >automatically goes to "No Surrender." Third, if the Germans accept an >armistice, determine which flavor of armistice it is. Yes indeed. A germane fact relating to this is that the first time withdrawing the French govenment to North Africa and continuing the fight in exile was discussed by the cabinate was on June 6 1940. As we all know, it was rejected (but was discussed again several times over the next few days). This does demonstrate that the nature of the historical surrender was by no means the only plausable scenario. They DID seriously consider withdrawing to Algiers, but events simply moved too fast. If France can hang in there for a while longer, it is hard to see the political realities not shifting accordingly. Regards to all Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 16:41:44 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: France Falls Again On Wed, 6 Mar 1996, Public Affairs Officer wrote: > Dear John: > > Your plans for handling the collapse of France look eminently > sensible to me. Looks like you've pretty much based on the actual factors > that were at work both externally (Germany battering France) and > internally (the strength and weakness of the French government. > > Most of the swift collapse of the Third Republic seems to be the > result of the sheer shock and violence of the German assault...in a week, > the French and British armies were completely defeated...combined with > the flabbiness of the French leadership. But it looks like you have a > handle on it. > Sure is interesting seeing everyone's comments! I second Dave Lippman's support of John Astell's plans for the fall of France. Why? Because it seems in accord with what historians have written on the subject. One of the standard histories in English of the Vichy regime is Robert O. Paxton's _Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order_. Paxton's central argument about the immediate post-armistice period is in fact that the shock of an unbelievable defeat is what made the French people and ruling elite act as they did. I also concur with Dave's interpretation of Shirer's work, because Paxton backs it up; the defeated generalship WAS instrumental in setting up what became the Vichy regime. We as wargamers know why France fell operationally, but the Weygand, Badouin and Laval crowd never bought it - as traditional French conservatives, they honestly believed that the real cause of the defeat was some sort of moral decay of the French nation and people in the 1920s - 30s. There was a latent belief, Paxton argues that it was all somehow "the left's fault." The best decision in 1940, Weygand thought, was to say uncle and prevent a leftist revolt, analagous to what happened in aftermath of the last defeat by Germany in 1871. Paxton also argues that almost every decision that motivated Vichy in 1940 was based on a belief that the war would end soon, and all the powers would convene in a mass peace conference of the Versailles style (hence the fear in Vichy minds "they're gonna try to get revenge for the harsh peace settlement _we_ socked _them_ with in 1919, so we really have to preserve our last strategic bargaining chips, the fleet and the empire.") Those that ruled in Vichy represented a sort of "the revenge of traditional French conservatism" Paxton notes that these guys were ***NOT*** facists - rather they resented all that the left in the Third Republic stood for, anticlericalism, socialism, suspension of Anglophobia, etc. Deep down inside, Paxton agrues, they really longed for an authoritarian France that could somehow be a twentieth-century version of the image they had of what Bourbon France was (and their idea of that, was incidentally, pretty inaccurate). The _operational defeat_ of 1940 is what gave these guys a reason to take power and preach "we lost because we were decadent, atheist, and amoral - now let's take our lumps and the Marshal will lead us to national rejuvenation." Paxton notes that the best example of all this is how Vichy replaced the old slogan of the French Republic that went back to 1792 of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" with "work, order and family" What all this means for Europa is that this traditional conservative faction of France's ruling elite won't _really_ rise up in protest until the war starts going badly, and going badly fast. It took the shock of defeat for those who became Vichy's rulers to say what they did, and more importantly it took the shock of the defeat for the majority of the population to buy it. And, as a whole, they *did* buy it in 1940 anyway, despite the claims of all those in 1944 who maintained they'd resisted from the start. John seems to have captured all these complexities in delineating in game terms the factors which will lead to France's request for an armistice. For example, it's a lot harder for Weygand to claim "the communists are about to rise in Paris, we must stop fighting the Germans now!" (which he did, around the 16th - 18th of June) if Reynaud can counter with a note that the British haven't abandoned them. I don't know if John is familiar with Paxton's works (Paxton wrote an earlier book called _Parades and Politics at Vichy_ about the Vichy officer corps), but at any rate, many scholars of modern French history would, I argue, be in accord with his suggestion. Mark Danley From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue) Subject: Re: supply (fwd) Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 17:38:08 -0500 (EST) > > Let's try out a radical idea for a moment. Say that > >the land element of a supply line can be traced only *one* > >hex to a road, or a number of hexes to a headquarters > >depending on the size of the headquarters. (e.g. maybe > >two hexes to a corps headquarters, more to an army HQ) > >The HQ could then trace to a higher HQ or trace a normal > >supply line (the land element being of reduced length if > >this rule is used). > > > > All attack supply and resource points are stored with > >HQs and kept on a secret offmap display. Attack supply and resource > >points are never put on the map! But, attack supply and resource points > >may be moved and immediately expended during any phase (e.g. the initial > >phase or the combat phase). The HQ has a certain number of SMP to > >move these things about, or to move itself with all of its points. > >Resource points may use rail movement in the initial phase, but > >attack points may not use rail movement in the attack phase. Only > >a limited number (depending on the HQ) of attack supply points may > >be moved by the HQ during the combat phase, although an unlimited > >number of units can trace attack supply to the HQ itself, if > >they are within the HQ's land element supply range. > > > > There should be some nationality restrictions on units tracing > >to HQs of other nationalities. > > > > HQs can be bombed. Bombing reduces their SMPs, or perhaps their > >supply range, or perhaps bombing should even destroy some of the points > >that the HQ has stored up. I don't know. > > > > It seems to me that such a rule, of which the above is only > >a rough approximation, would simplify some aspects of bookkeeping > >in the game, while increasing some others. But, it would shift > >some of the planning emphasis away from construction and towards > >offensives. Also, the truck rule could probably be done away with; > >a HQ would fulfill the functions of a truck. > > How would you get supplies to the arctic, then? Put a HQ in the artic, probably a corps. > > I preferred my version, where you could simply break out attack supply > points and resource points from the HQs and use them the old FWTBT way. > This seems simpler and more intuitive. Yes, that is nice, but you still have the problem that some number of points can be beamed to a HQ every turn, and no more. But, it sounds like there are many nice ideas out there. I'll have to look at the article in TEM. > > Mvh Elias Nordling > o-noreli@jmk.su.se > > > Best Wishes, Keith Pardue Kingston, Ontario, Canada From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue) Subject: Second Front Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 17:43:31 -0500 (EST) Hi, I was interested to see that Alan Conrad defended Sicily, and successfully, for a long time. When I played the Axis in Second Front, it seemed to me that Sicily was a death trap for any units I put there. So, I cleared them out quickly, blowing up infrastructure on the way. How have other players dealt with Sicily? Is it worth defending against a vigorous Allied attack? Also, I've wondered about invading Brittany in 1943 as the Allies, just as something to try. Has anyone tried anything like that, solitaire or otherwise? Did the Allies get smushed? Best Wishes, Keith Pardue Kingston, Ontario, Canada Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 17:46:23 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: France Falls Again On Tue, 5 Mar 1996, John M. Astell wrote: In an earlier message I verbosely yapped by support of John's interpretation of the factors influencing the French decision to seek an armistice. What happens NEXT is also of interest > > At some point, if the Germans do well enough, they will force the French to > take an armistice check, and the above factors will influence the check > (such as being die roll modifiers). As I see it, the range of possibilities > include: > > 1) No Surrender. France does not seek an armistice with the Axis, and will > continue to fighting even if driven out of metropolitan France. I see this as representing Reynaud finding the will browbeat the Weygand conservative crowd into submission. > > 2) Armistice/Weak Vichy, Strong Free French. France seeks an armistice with > the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, but remains largely hostile to > the Germans and anti-collaborationist. There's a strong Free French > movement, and French overseas possessions are likely to join the Free > French. This is perhaps a more likely possibility. I see this as representing the decision of someone with more prestige within the French government, military institutions, and society than DeGaulle (who enjoyed little prestige in any of those) deciding to reject the armistice. *This could have happened - and almost did* examples - 1. General Nogues, the commander of the ground and air forces in North Africa, considered resisting, but bowed to the authority of the Marshal 2. 80 or so members of the lower house of the French legislature who had voted against dissolving the Constitution of 1875 and giving Petain full power to draw up a new constitution sailed in the steamer _Massilia_ for a port in North Africa (somebody who's read Shirer's work correct me on the details of this if necessary) with the intent of setting up a government in opposition to the Vichy regime. After some hesitation, they were arrested. (William Shirer in _The Collapse of the Third Republic_ gives an account of these first two) 3. Admiral Darlan, the commander-in-chief of the French navy who enjoyed _immense_ personal prestige within the Navy, told Churchill and Royal Navy officers during the period from June 18 to June 25, that he was prepared to take the fleet, and continue the war under his own personal authority. He equivocated however, and didn't leave clear instructions to French squadron commanders (especially poor Gensoul at Mers-el-Kebir) Arthur Marder, _From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow_ gives an account of this, as does Warren Tute in _The Deadly Stroke_ What all this adds up to is SOMEONE of considerable influence could very well have set up an ant-axis regime to rival Vichy. The key is that that "someone" will have to have enough authority to convince major Colonial officials like old Boisson in French West Africa to follow them. Robert Paxton argues that the sentiments of most Colonial governors (in the French Empire, colonial governors were both administrative and military authorities) were A. inclined toward whoever seemed legitimate B. only latently anti-German, but more anti-British after Mers-el-Kebir and C. concerned chiefly with maintaining their tenure ("Yeah, I'll rally long as I'm still boss and this doesn't screw up my pension") Note that even DeGaulle himself was EXPECTING someone fairly important to take control. He initially tried to place himself under the orders of someone more prestigious than him - he sent a message like that to Nogues for example. (but DeGaulle is about the least credible source about his own intentions - he may have simply thought he could find a more prestigious patron and then manipulate himself into the real position of power) > > 3) Armistice/Vichy, Free French. France seeks an armistice with the Axis. A > neutral Vichy France is set up, and is somewhat collaborationist with the > Axis. There's a Free French movement, which remains anemic as long as Vichy > is seen as the legitimate government of France, and French overseas > possessions are unlikely to join the Free French. (This is the historical > outcome). I agree that this is analagous to the historical outcome. DeGaulle was a nobody in 1940, and the colonial governors who rallied to him were on the bottom of the totem pole of Imperial administration, they all had less to lose than the bigshots did. Felix Eboue, the governor of Chad (not exactly the most prestigious post for a French colonial administrator) for example was the one of the first to rally. Vice-admiral Muselier, the commander of DeGaulle's "navy" was even more of an outcast. DeGaulles biographers in English (Brian Cook, Aidan Crawley are two I remember) as well as Dorothy Shipley White in _DeGaulle and Black Africa_ discuss these considerations Obviously, this is most likely contigency. Most military and political authorities around the Empire were just as shocked as the people at home in Metropolitan France at the defeat - what they craved was some sense of stability - the figure of the Marshal provided this; DeGaulle the nobody could not. > > 4) Armistice/Strong Vichy, Weak Free French. France seeks an armistice with > the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, and is collaborationist with > the Axis, especially once the Axis goes to war with the USSR. There's a > very weak Free French movement (essentially a British propaganda ploy), and > French overseas possessions will not join the Free French. I see this as rather unlikely. Remember, according to Paxton throughout the fall of 1940, and even into 1941, Vichy thought the armisitice was only a prelude to a comprehensive peace agreement. Despite Churchill's rantings in his postwar memoirs there was NO WAY the Germans or the British or anyone was going to get their hands on the French fleet - the French knew they'd need the precious few remaining strategic assets they had at the supposedly upcoming peace conference (see Paxton and Marder on this one). Case in point - in October 1940, Hitler asked France what it would take to get Spain into the war as a full beligerent Axis partner. Franco said "give me Gibraltar and all of Morrocco" Hitler had to refuse, as Petain and Laval had just told him at the Montoire conference "you try to hork us into giving up North Africa, and we're back in the war on the Allied side, regardless of how much the British may have betrayed us up to this point!" On the other hand, there was a twisted motive to colloborate historically - Vichy wanted to show its "goodwill" towards the Germans regarding the final postwar settlement they believed imminent. But realism also dictated guarding fiercly their last two grand strategic assets - the fleet and the empire. This contigency of a very weak Free French movement and a closely collaborative Vichy COULD happen if the British handle operation CATAPULT even worse than they did, and Darlan, now virulently Anglophobic, takes over. (after all, some of Vichy's closest collaboration historically was after Darlan took over from Laval) Also, another historical motivation for French collaboration that most likely will never show up in Europa play but merits consideration, are the several hundred thousand POWs from the May - June campaign that the Germans continued to hold. (Release of some POWs is in part what the French got historically for allowing the overflight of Vichy Syria by the Luftwaffe units sent to help Rashid Ali's boys in Iraq in 41.) We see what Germany got in _War in the Desert_, but as an operational wargame, we don't see what the Germans' traded for it. Once Germany goes to war with the USSR, then, sure colloboration will increase. The problem is that the French officer corps as it survived under Vichy won't buy this type of close collaboration for very long. *The whole reason Vichy forces in Dakar in 1940 and Syria in 1941 resisted as tenaciously as they did is because the officers could still tell themselves Vichy was neutral, and they were only resisting British agression, NOT collaborating* (Paxton, _Parades and Politics_) Paxton notes that most French officers in the Empire, even under the Vichy regime REMAINED anti-German, its just that loyalty to the Marshal and belief in Vichy's "neutrality" overrode such a sentiment. If Vichy's collaboration was more blatant, the anti-German sentiment might win out. > Now, arranging the armistice looks to be a three step process. First, check > to see if France will seek an armistice or not. Second, without determining > which of the three flavors of armistice will be in force, check to see if > the Germans will accept or decline the armistice. If they decline, France > automatically goes to "No Surrender." Third, if the Germans accept an > armistice, determine which flavor of armistice it is. > Well, if you guys can tolerate such endless ranting, please respond. Mark Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 19:22:19 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: France Falls Again (forwarded from Mark H Danley) >X-POP3-Rcpt: jastell@prague >Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 17:46:23 -0600 (CST) >From: Mark H Danley >To: "John M. Astell" >cc: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz, europa@lysator.liu.se >Subject: Re: France Falls Again >MIME-Version: 1.0 > > > >On Tue, 5 Mar 1996, John M. Astell wrote: > >In an earlier message I verbosely yapped by support of John's >interpretation of the factors influencing the French decision to seek an >armistice. > >What happens NEXT is also of interest > > >> At some point, if the Germans do well enough, they will force the French to >> take an armistice check, and the above factors will influence the check >> (such as being die roll modifiers). As I see it, the range of possibilities >> include: >> >> 1) No Surrender. France does not seek an armistice with the Axis, and will >> continue to fighting even if driven out of metropolitan France. > >I see this as representing Reynaud finding the will browbeat the Weygand >conservative crowd into submission. > >> >> 2) Armistice/Weak Vichy, Strong Free French. France seeks an armistice with >> the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, but remains largely hostile to >> the Germans and anti-collaborationist. There's a strong Free French >> movement, and French overseas possessions are likely to join the Free >> French. > > This is perhaps a more likely possibility. I see this as >representing the decision of someone with more prestige within the French >government, military institutions, and society than DeGaulle (who enjoyed >little prestige in any of those) deciding to reject the armistice. > *This could have happened - and almost did* > >examples - 1. General Nogues, the commander of the ground and air forces in >North Africa, considered resisting, but bowed to the authority of the >Marshal > 2. 80 or so members of the lower house of the French >legislature who had voted against dissolving the Constitution of 1875 and >giving Petain full power to draw up a new constitution sailed in the >steamer _Massilia_ for a port in North Africa (somebody who's read >Shirer's work correct me on the details of this if necessary) with the >intent of setting up a government in opposition to the Vichy regime. After > some hesitation, they were arrested. > >(William Shirer in _The Collapse of the Third Republic_ gives an account >of these first two) > > 3. Admiral Darlan, the commander-in-chief of the French navy who > >enjoyed _immense_ personal prestige within the Navy, told Churchill and >Royal Navy officers during the period from June 18 to June 25, that he >was prepared to take the fleet, and continue the war under his own >personal authority. He equivocated however, and didn't leave clear >instructions to French squadron commanders (especially poor Gensoul at >Mers-el-Kebir) Arthur Marder, _From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow_ gives an >account of this, as does Warren Tute in _The Deadly Stroke_ > > What all this adds up to is SOMEONE of considerable influence >could very well have set up an ant-axis regime to rival Vichy. The key >is that that "someone" will have to have enough authority to convince major >Colonial officials like old Boisson in French West Africa to >follow them. Robert Paxton argues that the sentiments of most Colonial >governors (in the French Empire, colonial governors were both >administrative and military authorities) were A. inclined toward whoever >seemed legitimate B. only latently anti-German, but more anti-British >after Mers-el-Kebir and C. concerned chiefly with maintaining their tenure >("Yeah, I'll rally long as I'm still boss and this doesn't screw up my >pension") Note that even DeGaulle himself was EXPECTING someone fairly >important to take control. He initially tried to place himself under the >orders of someone more prestigious than him - he sent a message like that >to Nogues for example. (but DeGaulle is about the least credible source >about his own intentions - he may have simply thought he could find a >more prestigious patron and then manipulate himself into the real >position of power) > > >> >> 3) Armistice/Vichy, Free French. France seeks an armistice with the Axis. A >> neutral Vichy France is set up, and is somewhat collaborationist with the >> Axis. There's a Free French movement, which remains anemic as long as Vichy >> is seen as the legitimate government of France, and French overseas >> possessions are unlikely to join the Free French. (This is the historical >> outcome). > > I agree that this is analagous to the historical outcome. >DeGaulle was a nobody in 1940, and the colonial governors who rallied to >him were on the bottom of the totem pole of Imperial administration, they >all had less to lose than the bigshots did. Felix Eboue, the governor of >Chad (not exactly the most prestigious post for a French colonial >administrator) for example was the one of the first to rally. Vice-admiral >Muselier, the commander of DeGaulle's "navy" was even more of an outcast. > > DeGaulles biographers in English (Brian Cook, Aidan Crawley are >two I remember) as well as Dorothy Shipley White in _DeGaulle and Black >Africa_ discuss these considerations > > Obviously, this is most likely contigency. Most military and >political authorities around the Empire were just as shocked as the >people at home in Metropolitan France at the defeat - what they craved >was some sense of stability - the figure of the Marshal provided this; >DeGaulle the nobody could not. > >> >> 4) Armistice/Strong Vichy, Weak Free French. France seeks an armistice with >> the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, and is collaborationist with >> the Axis, especially once the Axis goes to war with the USSR. There's a >> very weak Free French movement (essentially a British propaganda ploy), and >> French overseas possessions will not join the Free French. > > I see this as rather unlikely. Remember, according to Paxton > throughout the fall of 1940, and even into 1941, Vichy thought the >armisitice was only a prelude to a comprehensive peace agreement. >Despite Churchill's rantings in his postwar memoirs there was NO WAY the >Germans or the British or anyone was going to get their hands on the French >fleet - the French knew they'd need the precious few remaining strategic >assets they had at the supposedly upcoming peace conference (see Paxton >and Marder on this one). Case in point - in October 1940, Hitler asked >France what it would take to get Spain into the war as a full beligerent >Axis partner. Franco said "give me Gibraltar and all of Morrocco" >Hitler had to refuse, as Petain and Laval had just told him at the >Montoire conference "you try to hork us into giving up North Africa, and >we're back in the war on the Allied side, regardless of how much the >British may have betrayed us up to this point!" > > On the other hand, there was a twisted motive to colloborate >historically - Vichy wanted to show its "goodwill" towards the Germans >regarding the final postwar settlement they believed imminent. But >realism also dictated guarding fiercly their last two grand strategic assets >- the fleet and the empire. This contigency of a very weak Free French >movement and a closely collaborative Vichy COULD happen if the British >handle operation CATAPULT even worse than they did, and Darlan, now >virulently Anglophobic, takes over. (after all, some of Vichy's >closest collaboration historically was after Darlan took over from >Laval) Also, another historical motivation for French collaboration that most >likely will never show up in Europa >play but merits consideration, are the several hundred thousand POWs from >the May - June campaign that the Germans continued to hold. (Release of >some POWs is in part what the French got historically for allowing the >overflight of Vichy Syria by the Luftwaffe units sent to help Rashid >Ali's boys in Iraq in 41.) We see what Germany got in _War in the >Desert_, but as an operational wargame, we don't see what the Germans' >traded for it. Once Germany goes to war with the USSR, then, sure >colloboration will increase. The problem is that the French officer >corps as it survived under Vichy won't buy this type of close >collaboration for very long. *The whole reason Vichy forces in Dakar in >1940 and Syria in 1941 resisted as tenaciously as they did is because the >officers could still tell themselves Vichy was neutral, and they were >only resisting British agression, NOT collaborating* (Paxton, _Parades >and Politics_) Paxton notes that most French officers in the Empire, >even under the Vichy regime REMAINED anti-German, its just that loyalty >to the Marshal and belief in Vichy's "neutrality" overrode such a >sentiment. If Vichy's collaboration was more blatant, the anti-German >sentiment might win out. > >> Now, arranging the armistice looks to be a three step process. First, check >> to see if France will seek an armistice or not. Second, without determining >> which of the three flavors of armistice will be in force, check to see if >> the Germans will accept or decline the armistice. If they decline, France >> automatically goes to "No Surrender." Third, if the Germans accept an >> armistice, determine which flavor of armistice it is. >> > > Well, if you guys can tolerate such endless ranting, please respond. > > >Mark Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 20:13:35 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: France Falls Again >On Tue, 5 Mar 1996, Mark H. Danley wrote: > >In an earlier message I verbosely yapped by support of John's >interpretation of the factors influencing the French decision to seek an >armistice... > >> 3) Armistice/Vichy, Free French. France seeks an armistice with the Axis. A >> neutral Vichy France is set up, and is somewhat collaborationist with the >> Axis. There's a Free French movement, which remains anemic as long as Vichy >> is seen as the legitimate government of France, and French overseas >> possessions are unlikely to join the Free French. (This is the historical >> outcome). > > I agree that this is analagous to the historical outcome. >DeGaulle was a nobody in 1940, and the colonial governors who rallied to >him were on the bottom of the totem pole of Imperial administration, they >all had less to lose than the bigshots did. Felix Eboue, the governor of >Chad (not exactly the most prestigious post for a French colonial >administrator) for example was the one of the first to rally. Vice-admiral >Muselier, the commander of DeGaulle's "navy" was even more of an outcast. > I have worked out the Vichy ground and air OB for Europa -- the OB and counters for this will appear in War in the Desert (the naval OB may appear, too, if it comes in before we go to press, but the naval counters will be the same as those of the pre-Vichy French navy and thus will not be included). Here's how things break down: metropolitan France, all French colonies in continental Africa, and the Levant are covered in Europa. (Those colonies south of the regular map coverage will be represented as holding boxes on an Africa chart.) Madagascar and French possessions elsewhere (Asia and the Americas) are not represented. (Madagascar is alloted to the Indian ocean theater and thus to the Glory system. Note that the British left Madagascar alone, until 1942 when Japan's approach to the Indian Ocean raised fears that the Japanese would grab the island.) French colonies are grouped in continguous regions. Each colonial region will check whether it rallies to the Free French or stays loyal to Vichy: French North Africa: French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. (Yes, Algerian is officially part of France, and Morocco is a protectorate, etc. Europa ignores all these distinctions and treats such territory as it effectively was governed: as colonies.) French West Africa: Senegal, French Soudan, and various other colonies in the bulge of Africa. French Equatorial Africa: Gabon, French Cameroun, Chad, etc. French East Africa: French Somaliland (the modern Djibouti). The Levant: Lebanon and Syria (both were French mandates from the league of nations but in reality treated little different from outright French colonies. The French had divided Syria in several nominally separate statelets (sanjaks), but this was just a ploy to weaken Syrian nationalists. No one (not even the French) really treated these statelets seriously. BTW, Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade has to take place in one of these statelets -- the Nazis in the movie bribe the local puppet ruler and get his old WW1 tank.) For the historical outcome of the French armistice, each colonial regional area probably should have a 1/6 chance of going over to the Free French (with die roll modifiers making it impossible for French North Africa to do so at this level of armisitice). Historically, French Equatorial Africa goes over, and the French military commander in the Levant tries to get the Levant to go over but gets persuaded (reluctantly it seems) to stay loyal to Vichy. "Stay loyal to Vichy" is an important consideration. Hindsight shows that de Gaulle was right, and the Free French efforts immense helped reestablish France as an important Allied nation by the end of the war. (Unlike Italy, which was never treated seriously after switching sides in 1943.) In 1940, however, de Gaulle was a renegade in the eyes of many Frenchmen. The legitimate government of France negotiated the armistice with Germany and ran the unoccupied zone of France from its seat in Vichy. Most Frenchmen felt that honoring the terms of the armistice was the best way for France to survive the war, and all that the Free French were doing in 1940-41 was giving the Germans a pretext to treat France more harshly. Only after Germany violated the armistice outright and occupied Vichy (Nov. 1942) did the Free French government in exile become legitimate in the eyes of most Frenchmen. >> 4) Armistice/Strong Vichy, Weak Free French. France seeks an armistice with >> the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, and is collaborationist with >> the Axis, especially once the Axis goes to war with the USSR. There's a >> very weak Free French movement (essentially a British propaganda ploy), and >> French overseas possessions will not join the Free French. > > I see this as rather unlikely.... >Despite Churchill's rantings in his postwar memoirs there was NO WAY the >Germans or the British or anyone was going to get their hands on the French >fleet - the French knew they'd need the precious few remaining strategic >assets they had at the supposedly upcoming peace conference (see Paxton >and Marder on this one).... Ah, but when I wrote "A neutral Vichy France is set up, and is collaborationist with the Axis," I did inded mean collaborationist, and not allied to Germany. Vichy remains neutral, and the French fleet untouched. The Vichy government would be more inclined (than historical) to let Axis supplies and even troops pass through their colonies -- such as through Tunisia, allowing the Axis to more or less bypass Malta -- and would perhaps allow greater recruiting of Frenchmen to serve in Axis units. (The recruitment of the Legion Volontaire Francaise, aka German Army Regiment 638, was neither helped nor hindered by Vichy. With Vichy sanction, the LVF might have become a division as originally discussess, rather than just a regiment.) From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 14:19 GMT Subject: And still France falls I'm just finishing Shirer's Collapse of the Third Republic, which is detailed, well-written, and fascinating, so the fall of the House of Reynaud is very much on my mind. One of the things that was striking about the Third Republic was how its servants were very hostile to it. Weygand was a monarchist, for example. Petain, Laval, Baudoin, made no secret of their dislike of the Republic. They identified it with Bolshevism, Socialism, high taxes, and Jews. Of course, part of the hostility came out of the WW1 and the Great Depression, in which European civilization was faced with the spectacle of Western democracy being unable to contend with two of the greatest upheavals in history, that shattered the social structure of what was still the world's ruling nations. Democracy couldn't end WW1. After it did, it couldn't solve the Great Depression. But over in Germany and Russia, authoritarian forms of government were solving the Great Depression. Admittedly the means by which they did were unpleasant and bloodthirsty, but you had to admit that that Mussolini chap made the trains run on time, and they certainly were prospering over in Germany. The only victims, it seemed, were a bunch of unruly Socialists, union men, and Jews. Democracy was not highly regarded, even in America. Those in college (who could afford it) turned to the Left, along with the Federal Theater. Waiting For Lefty, for example, Clifford Odets' brilliant play, was essentially an endorsement for the biggest socialist union around, namely the Soviet Union. Thus was the intellectual groundwork laid for Anglo-American support of Republican Spain in 1937. Among those who backed Communism in the 1930s were John Dos Passos, Sherwood Anderson, Erskine Caldwell, Upton Sinclair, Lincoln Steffens, and Granville Hicks. Edmund Wilson said Russia was "the moral top of the world where the light really never goes out." William Allen White called the Soviet Union the "most interesting place on earth." Elmer Davis said the profit system was dead. F. Scott Fitzgerald, chronicler of the rich, said "To bring on the revolution, it may be necessary to work inside the Communist Party." Will Rogers said "Those rascals in Russia have got mighty good ideas. Just think of everybody int he country going to work." Even Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi said, "I'm getting a little Red myself." Minnesota's Gov. Floyd B. Olson said, "Tell 'em Olson is taking recruits for the Minnesota National Guard, and he isn't taking anybody who doesn't carry a Red card. Minnesota is a left-wing state." Those who couldn't afford college turned to the right, and sent their pennies to Huey Long and Charles Coughlin. The American Legion passed a resolution asserting that the Depression could not be "promptly and efficiently met by existing political methods." The American Fascist Organization and Order of Black Shirts was formed. It was joined by the Silver Shirts, the White Shirts, the Khaki Shirts, and Fritz Kuhn's brownshirted American Nazis. They didn't seem a threat, but they tried...a New York bond salesman approached Marine war hero Gen. Smedley Butler with a diabolical plot... that Butler be the "man on horseback" to lead an organization styled after France's Croix De Feu, that would remove FDR from power. Butler demurred, and spilled the beans to the House Un-American Activities Committee, but the bond salesman went ahead with one stage of his plan...he created the Liberty League. It wasn't just ideologues, though. Nicholas Murray Butler told his students that totalitarian regimes brought forth "men of far greater intelligence, far stronger character and far more courage than the system of elections." He was tough to argue with...he held a Nobel Prize, 34 honorary degrees, and was president of Columbia University. Totalitarianism was quite popular...Alf Landon endorsed it: "Even the iron hand of a national dictator is in preference to a paralytic stroke." Hamilton Fish said the people would demand a dictator if not given one. Al Smith thought the Constitution should be wrapped up and laid "on the shelf" until the crisis was over. Clare Booth Luce demanded a dictator in the pages of her magazine, Vanity Fair (of all places), and so did Walter Lippmann. Those with money were nervous. Henry Ford carried a gun. Cops were fast with the nightstick. Guards killed miners in Pennsylvania, and a delegation of unemployed pleading their cause to Richmond, Va.'s Mayor J. Fulmer Bright were hurled out of City Hall by cops. Businessmen in some American cities formed committees to cope with siege, should the unemployed workers (some of whom were rallying to sing "The Internationale") revolted. A Hollywood director carried with him a wardrobe of old clothes so he could disappear into a crowd at a moment's notice. In New York, hotels discovered that wealthy guests who usually leased su ites for the winter were holing up in their country homes. Some mounted machine guns on the roof. William Manchester wrote in his "The Glory and the Dream," a history of the US from 1932 to 1972, that the wealthy were not paranoid. Had FDR been another Hoover, there was a good chance that the U.S. would have followed seven Latin American nations whose governments were overthrown by Depression victims. Charles Schwab wrote, "Capitalism is on trial and on the issue of this trial may depend the whole future of Western civilization." The trial was worldwide. In France, the nation teetered on the brink of coup d'etat and civil war on Feb. 6, 1934. The blood flowed in the Place de La Concorde, and the Senate trembled. But the revolution failed. Instead came the Popular Front, which was neither. British leaders, frightened of Communism, sought alliance with Hitler. So did Germany's business elite. Anything to preserve the old order. Instead it collapsed. From the perspective of 1932, Fascism and Communism looked inviting indeed. When Marshal Petain and Pierre Laval created their Vichy state, they probably thought that Hitler was a fellow they could work with (as did Chamberlain and Daladier). To their amazement, Petain and Laval were wrong. For once, the leader of a great industrial state was no gentleman...Hitler was a thug. Anyway, those folks on the Massilia did get out of France, but they didn't get very far, winding up in North Africa, I believe, pretty much sitting out the war until Operation Torch. I think the Strong Vichy/Weak Free France armistice condition is when the French do worse in the game than historically, which is possible.That could be a situation where the British are unable to evacuate their army, and the BEF goes to destruction. As far as releasing PoWs to Vichy in return for Iraqi overflight, that could be accomplished in game terms, whereby Vichy France gains RPs if they allow Nazi overflights to Iraq. These RPs could then be turned into partisans or French troops either by the Vichy French or by the Allies when they pull Operation Torch. John Keegan adds that a number of Vichy officers who went over to De Gaulle after Torch (and fought well, like Mast, Juin, Koeltz, and Bethouart) stayed loyal to Vichy mostly because they regarded De Gaulle's forces as adventuristic upstarts. Regardless of the politics, these guys (Mast etc.) said, they had a moral obligation to serve the French government, however it was convened. They showed their considerable abilities with French Expeditionary Corps in Italy and French 1st Army in Operation Dragoon. Similarly the Nazis' toughest PoW camp, the legendary Colditz was full of French Third Republic officers who showed endless contempt for their captors by harassing their guards and attempting escape. Yet while they maintained an appropriate patriotic fury through the long years of war and captivity, these PoWs showed disdain for the odd Free French officer who was bundled in. Either way, it's clear that France of the 1930s suffered from a flabbiness and weakness of leadership at political, military, and social levels, such that it was unable to steel itself in extremis. Probably the worst thing was that the government was run by people who held the nation's institutions in contempt. Best, Dave Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 15:18 GMT Subject: Dividing up French colonies The cutting up of France's far-flung holdings looks good so far. Obviously, New Caledonia, Reunion, the Comoros, and French Polynesia are part of the Glory system (along with their military machine, such as it is), along with Etablissements Francaise dans l'Indie, or French India, which is Mahe, Pondicherry, and a couple of other trading ports left over from the Bourbons. What happens to Martinique, St. Martin, Guadeloupe, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and French Guiana? Best, Dave Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 22:08:09 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: France Falls Again On Tue, 5 Mar 1996, John M. Astell wrote: > I have worked out the Vichy ground and air OB for Europa -- the OB and > counters for this will appear in War in the Desert (the naval OB may > appear, too, if it comes in before we go to press, but the naval counters > will be the same as those of the pre-Vichy French navy and thus will not be > included). Here's how things break down: metropolitan France, all French > colonies in continental Africa, and the Levant are covered in Europa. > (Those colonies south of the regular map coverage will be represented as > holding boxes on an Africa chart.) Madagascar and French possessions > elsewhere (Asia and the Americas) are not represented. (Madagascar is > alloted to the Indian ocean theater and thus to the Glory system. Note that > the British left Madagascar alone, until 1942 when Japan's approach to the > Indian Ocean raised fears that the Japanese would grab the island.) > > French colonies are grouped in continguous regions. Each colonial region > will check whether it rallies to the Free French or stays loyal to Vichy: > > French North Africa: French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. (Yes, Algerian > is officially part of France, and Morocco is a protectorate, etc. Europa > ignores all these distinctions and treats such territory as it effectively > was governed: as colonies.) > > French West Africa: Senegal, French Soudan, and various other colonies in > the bulge of Africa. > > French Equatorial Africa: Gabon, French Cameroun, Chad, etc. > > French East Africa: French Somaliland (the modern Djibouti). > > The Levant: Lebanon and Syria (both were French mandates from the league of > nations but in reality treated little different from outright French > colonies. The French had divided Syria in several nominally separate > statelets (sanjaks), but this was just a ploy to weaken Syrian > nationalists. No one (not even the French) really treated these statelets > seriously. BTW, Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade has to take place in one > of these statelets -- the Nazis in the movie bribe the local puppet ruler > and get his old WW1 tank.) > > For the historical outcome of the French armistice, each colonial regional > area probably should have a 1/6 chance of going over to the Free French > (with die roll modifiers making it impossible for French North Africa to do > so at this level of armisitice). Historically, French Equatorial Africa > goes over, and the French military commander in the Levant tries to get the > Levant to go over but gets persuaded (reluctantly it seems) to stay loyal > to Vichy. Looks pretty good - but keep in mind De Gaulle has to actually fight to get all of Equatorial Africa; Chad rallies first, then Ubangi Shari. Two Gaullist "emissaries" go to Duala in the Cameroons (I think one is Leclerc), and stage what's basically a minicoup. But a Vichy general named Tetu (I don't remember his first name) with a wopping four battalions of colonial infantry resists in Gabon. After the Dakar fiasco, a Free French force lands at Libreville in Gabon and defeats Tetu. [Uh-oh! operational level activity! Well you know what that means! Die-hard Europa fans of the "inclusionist" school of game design will shout "Quick, somebody crank out about 18 maps for all central Africa and we can push a few counters around on them - heck we'll even make a Narvik-level simulation optional for the fighting in Gabon, for those who want greater detail" - don't forget the naval action - I think Vichy and FNFL sloops of the same class get into a gunnery duel off Libreville; I'll have to check - we'll need an optional module for that] Well, maybe we shouldn't go THAT far! Seriously, if the designers decide to go with holding boxes, they could have either an intrinsic strength that the Allied player can go down and eliminate if a colony doesn't rally, or alternately, the Axis player could shift counters between the boxes as he feels necessary, given certain restrictions. The latter might not be bad, since the Vichy government did reinforce Senegal with ground forces a few weeks before DeGaulle and his Royal Navy friends come steaming up to Dakar in late September. I think we'll have to be careful about adjusting the die-roll table for colonies rallying, West Africa is less likely to rally than the Equatorial African colonies. Once a colony does rally, we might remove any Vichy garrison, but not reinforcements, and give the Allied player replacement points from which he can form Free French units. Historically, a regiment of Senegalese came with the territory when Chad rallied. That and some impressed cars and trucks is where that Free French 1-8 mot III that rolls onto the south edge of the map in War in the Desert comes from. If I understand the game design correctly, they take so long to get there because they've spent the whole game cranking 16 imaginary off-map hexes a turn to get there from Lake Chad) In game terms we're not talking about a particularly large force overall - if all West Africa and Equatorial Africa rally maybe you get the equivalent of 10 - 12 combat factors, plus a few old fighters! Perhaps even after the determining the initial allegiance in the post-armistice turn, we could allow the Allied player in future turns to try an Operation Menace (the attempted forcible "rallying" of Dakar) or two. Success would be unlikely at this point, but possible I suppose. Arthur Marder also wrote a book about the Dakar operation, I think called _Defeat at Dakar_, and he saw the loss of surprise as the main cause of the failure of the mission) In game turns, Menace would be Naval Transporting a Royal Marine Brigade, whatever Free French ground forces are in play, and a naval task force to a Vichy colonial holding box, and rolling to see if they resist at full strength, half strength, or not at all. Again, the first result should be the most likely. > "Stay loyal to Vichy" is an important consideration. Hindsight shows that > de Gaulle was right, and the Free French efforts immense helped reestablish > France as an important Allied nation by the end of the war. (Unlike Italy, > which was never treated seriously after switching sides in 1943.) In 1940, > however, de Gaulle was a renegade in the eyes of many Frenchmen. The > legitimate government of France negotiated the armistice with Germany and > ran the unoccupied zone of France from its seat in Vichy. Most Frenchmen > felt that honoring the terms of the armistice was the best way for France > to survive the war, and all that the Free French were doing in 1940-41 was > giving the Germans a pretext to treat France more harshly. Only after > Germany violated the armistice outright and occupied Vichy (Nov. 1942) did > the Free French government in exile become legitimate in the eyes of most > Frenchmen. > Sure ... If I understand your meaning, you and I are on the same sheet of music and with my reading of historians like Paxton . > >> 4) Armistice/Strong Vichy, Weak Free French. France seeks an armistice with > >> the Axis. A neutral Vichy France is set up, and is collaborationist with > >> the Axis, especially once the Axis goes to war with the USSR. There's a > >> very weak Free French movement (essentially a British propaganda ploy), and > >> French overseas possessions will not join the Free French. > > > > I see this as rather unlikely.... > >Despite Churchill's rantings in his postwar memoirs there was NO WAY the > >Germans or the British or anyone was going to get their hands on the French > >fleet - the French knew they'd need the precious few remaining strategic > >assets they had at the supposedly upcoming peace conference (see Paxton > >and Marder on this one).... > > Ah, but when I wrote "A neutral Vichy France is set up, and is > collaborationist with the Axis," I did inded mean collaborationist, and not > allied to Germany. Vichy remains neutral, and the French fleet untouched. > The Vichy government would be more inclined (than historical) to let Axis > supplies and even troops pass through their colonies -- such as through > Tunisia, allowing the Axis to more or less bypass Malta -- and would > perhaps allow greater recruiting of Frenchmen to serve in Axis units. (The > recruitment of the Legion Volontaire Francaise, aka German Army Regiment > 638, was neither helped nor hindered by Vichy. With Vichy sanction, the LVF > might have become a division as originally discussess, rather than just a > regiment.) > > Sure! If "collaborationist" means what you say here, I agree. My mistake for assuming you meant France would become an outright ally of Germany. Darlan in control might result in this in this fourth option; i.e., greater cooperation than historically, maybe allowing greater LVF as a division and passage through Tunisia are not as serious as turning the fleet over! Also, to handle CATAPULT, we could try the following: On the first turn after the Armistice, all French task forces in British controlled ports are immobilized (removed) - the Allied player may get a portion of them back when a French government which enjoys relatively widespread support re-enters the war. Historically, all the ships in British ports were seized forcibly, and Force X at Alexandria demobilized by personal agreement between the French commander Admiral Godfroy, who wanted nothing to do with the Free French, and the RN commander Admiral Cunningham. After Torch when mainstream French officers feel they can legitimately fight again, Force X is refitted and contributes to the Allied effort in the Med in 43. French task forces at French-owned ports stay where they are. Regardless of wherever the COLONY's allegiance goes, the British can try to rally the French naval units there. This should be unlikely, but possible. In Warren Tute's account of the Mers-el-Kebir episode _The Deadly Stroke_, Admiral Gensoul considers sortieing with the British against the Italians, but, numbed by the recent defeat, opts for the stability of staying put. (Tute used a lot of primary source material, including interviews with French officers who were there) We might have to require the British player to do this, including requiring him to attack any French TF's not rallied or demobilized. Admiral Sommerville and others told Churchill repeatedly that the French would send their ships to the bottom without a scratch on them before they'd let the Germans near them, but Churchill still didn't trust him. Actually, Sommerville opened fire on the French squadron at Oran only when given a direct order that afternoon from the Prime Minister himself. Of course, the possibilities for rallying French TF's would vary depending on what kind of armistice is signed (weak Vichy, strong FF to collaborationist Vichy, very week FF - add die roll mods like John suggested for colonies) Last, whatever French ground units are evacuated to Britain from France and Norway after playing the Fall of France, are removed yielding a variable, but small amount of Free French replacement points. Historically, of the French troops awaiting repatriation in Britain after the armistice, DeGaulle could only get a few thousand to sign onto his movement- but he did get those few thousand. Fans of the east front games and die-hard competitive players are probably irritated by these messages now. Talk about much ado about nothing. All this e-mail over what even I admit is fewer combat factors than in a healthy Guards Tank Army! But what the hey. Mark Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 22:18:57 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: And still France falls On Wed, 6 Mar 1996, Public Affairs Officer wrote: When Marshal Petain and Pierre Laval created their Vichy state, they > probably thought that Hitler was a fellow they could work with (as did > Chamberlain and Daladier). To their amazement, Petain and Laval were > wrong. For once, the leader of a great industrial state was no > gentleman...Hitler was a thug. > Anyway, those folks on the Massilia did get out of France, but they > didn't get very far, winding up in North Africa, I believe, pretty much > sitting out the war until Operation Torch. > Interesting comments on the 30s. Hey, I like pushing feldgrau counters across the maps as much as the next guy, but what Dave talking about here is all about why there was a war for us to wargame. I think the Strong Vichy/Weak Free France armistice condition is > when the French do worse in the game than historically, which is > possible.That could be a situation where the British are unable to > evacuate their army, and the BEF goes to destruction. > As far as releasing PoWs to Vichy in return for Iraqi overflight, > that could be accomplished in game terms, whereby Vichy France gains RPs > if they allow Nazi overflights to Iraq. These RPs could then be turned > into partisans or French troops either by the Vichy French or by the > Allies when they pull Operation Torch. Interesting idea - I didn't think of that. I was interested in your citation of Keegan's comments too. > Either way, it's clear that France of the 1930s suffered from a > flabbiness and weakness of leadership at political, military, and social > levels, such that it was unable to steel itself in extremis. Probably the > worst thing was that the government was run by people who held the > nation's institutions in contempt. > That's true. To some extent France, like Italy, just wasn't ready, willing, or able to fight a world war in 1940, but that might have been different Mark Date: Tue, 05 Mar 1996 22:53:22 -0500 From: "James B. Byrne" Subject: Re: France Falls Again I don't have a problem with Mr. Astell's version of history playing out, provided nothing seriously changes between Sep 39 and April/March '40 vis a vis the Allies and the Axis. However, if Germany plays fast and loose in Poland, and France pushes into the Saar or (heaven forbid) seriously threatens the Rhur valley, then what will be the German reaction? We know what happened to France, because it did. And we can project from that point. But reality is that the German Army underwent a considerable re-organization between the end of the Polish campaign and the beginning of the French. The motorized/light panzer divisions particularly. If France had pushed hard in the west while Germany's army was occupied in the east, what would have been the political effect on Germany? Would Hitler have faced the revolt of the generals in the fall of '39 instead of '44? I raise this issue because its seems unbalanced to so finely examine the options open to France while assuming that Germany was invunerable to the political consequences of possible French/Allied actions. A more dynamic French leadership, militarily speaking, could have possibly forced a political crisis in Germany equal to that suffered by France the following spring. -- James B. Byrne mailto:byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca Harte & Lyne Limited http://www.harte-lyne.ca Hamilton, Ontario 905-561-1241 Date: Wed, 6 Mar 96 08:47:22 +0100 From: peterlj@smab.se (Peter Ljungberg) Subject: Supply and NODLs Courtenay Footman wrote: > While I agree that in theory something should be done about supply > (the argument about the 44-45 red army is compelling), I want to > point out that other things would have to change for this to work. > > In particular, something would have to be done about the "non-over- > runable double line" of defense. I find that typical attacks, > particularly in FiTE, are already much slower than historical, >because > of the NODL's. Grand pockets simply do not occur. So I feel that > supply should only be changed in conjunction with some changes >allowing > a front to be broken. Actually, supply rules should aid this >change, > otherwise it would be very difficult to make a change to the attack > rules balanced. I agree completely, and will again refer to the article in TEM 43/44, which tried to adress three things (increase attacker attrition, hamper NODLs and introduce revise supply rules), and which I believe is a good start. More summary for those who haven`t read the article: CRT slightly modified to include the chance of attrition losses for the attacker, even if the attack succeeds. Some results on the CRT are marked with an asterisk which means that the attacker takes x RE of losses (3 I think was suggested). a DE* is, for example, a possible result. Variable strength overruns also introduced to make NODLs more difficult. Supply system modified per previous posts. I think this is the type of overhaul of the system which might make things more historically accurate. If the changes introduced are not too great, do not introduce a remarkable increase of complexity and manage to adress the problems we believe are there, then I`m for it. Cheers! Peter From: Rich Velay Subject: SF Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 00:50:04 PST Hi Kieth. Concerning your questioning the advisability of defending Sicily as the Axis. I would agree with you, it can't be defended. Reinforcement is iffy, supply is easily cut and getting anything of the survivors can be problematic. Reading about Conrad's experience of holding it until, what was it, mid '44, had me shaking my head. I can't imagine how such a thing could be possible, even against a *very* pacific and careful Allied player. Come on Conrad, out with it, how did you accomplish what others have assumed was impossible? Inquiring minds want to know! :) The main problem for the Axis, as I see it, is supply. Under RAW, none of the ports on Sicily can be used as a source or conduit of supply, because of the Axis Danger Zone surrounding the island. Thus you have to rely upon the Rail Ferries and the LC. The LC should be sunk, whether by Allied air or Axis DZ, by the end of the Jul I game turn; getting a replaced LC back to Messina and having it survive for a game turn is unlikely, at best. That leaves the Rail Ferries. Maximum port damage on Messina alone, or on the two minor Calabrian ports the RF links up with means the RF can't function. And you can't trace a rail element supply line over a non-functioning RF. Since this only requires either 8 Port Hits at Messina or 10 hits (total) at the two ports in Calabria, this is not difficult for the Allies to accomplish. Since the Axis will also be isolated, they will be halved on the attack unless they can repair the rail ferry through repairing one of the ports that make it up. Heavy Harassment of Messina can prevent the Axis from repairing hits. And without supply, how can the Axis survive. To say nothing of the fact that if they are isolated for the Combat Phase ISO check, they will generate no special replacements! And again, that is simplicity itself for the Allies to accomplish. Man, I run away as soon as I see the first airborne battalion friendly a port for the Allies; I know its hopeless after that. Risking the German Army for Sicily just doesn't appeal, you know?.... :) late/R RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY