Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 23:45:21 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be) I concur with Ray's comments about the French. They hang too tough for too long. Chateau generalship just wasn't viable in WW 2 and that's exactly the way the French were geared to conduct the war. Jason Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 22:29:56 -0600 From: conrad alan b Subject: Re: FTF victory points scales On Mon, 18 Mar 1996, David Holmes wrote: > In FTF, the victory conditions clearly state that the Germans should win, > and the game should be played twice with each player taking both sides once. > Has anyone come up with a victory points chart based on the historical > outcome which would give a victory indication without 2 games? > > David Holmes > I have wanted to write up an article concerning the victory conditions in First to Fight for TEM for some time. I'll deliver the message off the top right here. Yes the Germans will always `win' that is take Poland. One certainly can play with the victory conditions as given and the German player can win the war and lose the game. My problem has always been that the Europa system as it is played in FtF really locks in the play. The Germans can only do so much, if the Pole plays well. And he can't do too bad unless he takes chances that have very little percentage of paying off. Without going into the details the German is almost guaranteed a marginal victory (or is it tactical, I don't have the game in front of me, but first level victory). He can do little more or less. As to how to base a one game set of victory conditions that would be any getter, it would be hard. The German can hardly force the Poles to surrender any earlier, and The Poles can not really hold out any longer, there is only a one or two turn window. Since the Germans can do the best they can possibly do with taking almost no losses in Europa terms one can not use losses very easily. And if the Polish player reads the victory conditions he can certainly get his units over a neutral border and there is nothing the Germans can do about it. Of course if the Pole is foolish enough to actually try to beat the Germans that would be another tale. But any Europa players is playing for victory points, not to save his country Alan Conrad Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 00:13:52 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: Re: Howling about Alan's post. We've had discussions over the years about actually using unit designations on air counters, but have always been frustrated by the fact that the US and UK just really can't be straight-jacketed into 40 airplane counters as the US fighter groups had about 75 airplanes and the Brits had wings that comprised between 3 and 5 squadrons of fighters, but they didn't use enough for each counter and only used the wing to control fighters, not for bombers. Some RAF bomber squadrons were almost big enough to be a counter by themselves. Contrarily, the Germans fit the standard almost exactly until they add a fourth staffel to some of their fighter gruppen. We also figured that the temptation to treat a named counter like its real counterpart would be very strong for us researchers and that complicates things immensly as everybody moved things around in units that don't match up well with Europa conventions I know that that Fw 190D conversion on Sep 44 is III/JG 54, but that's only because I researched the Luftwaffe OB myself. That's kind of a shame, but I really don't see a way around it unless we follow Dave Berry's Bro Rules where the individual squadron is the basic air unit counter. I think that individual ships and aircraft types were added for flavor as generic "points" are seriously bland. And I don't think that the Europa air system models the real air campaign well with the exception of the Strat air War rules, which come close. But I'm not sure that's necessary to model it accurately so long as the net effect is much the same. I think it may be more powerful in Europa than it was historically, but that's just my opinion and I haven't actually played SF to substatiate my opinion. Jason Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 00:22:46 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be) IMO, Norway and Sweden were much more important than most people seem to relaize because whoever controls Norway dictates where the Swedes send their iron ore. If the Germans are defeated in Norway than the economic repercussions are immense as the Swedes ship their iron to the UK rather than to the Germans. The Swedes were practical folk; they would pay attention to whoever could yell the loudest and ownership of Norway and the general progress of the war were the two sources of loudness as the Swedes realized that an amphibious invasion of Sweden wasn't a viable threat, especially if the Allies were ensconsed in Oslo. Jason Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 23:47:16 -0600 From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant) Subject: Re: Howling about Alan's post. Jason said: >We've had discussions over the years about actually using unit >designations on air counters, but have always been frustrated by the fact >that the US and UK just really can't be straight-jacketed into 40 >airplane counters ... I was thinking about letting the size vary as needed, just as we do for ground units: forget 40-plane counters. We don't portray all ground units in fake regiments; we portray them according to historical operational deployment. Presumably the historical air unit deployments were mostly in large units over the West front and in smaller units in the Arctic, Near East, and other out-of-the-way places. We can throw in some breakdowns for operational flexibility; maybe even provide "cadres" for the larger/stronger units. I know this will screw up all the air system tables, but as I have already indicated, I think the air system needs a *major* overhaul anyway. (It's too complicated for use with the ground system, unless you want to abstract the ground and naval rules to play a simulation of the air war!) My suggestion will also complicate the basing rules, but the variety of sizes can be quanticized into a small number of categories just as the ground units are. (I.e., all divisions are the same size for game purposes -- stacking, transport, etc. -- regardless of how many men/tanks/guns the counters actually represent. Ditto for regiments and battalions.) Quanticizing the air system will be no worse than what we do now, where a "group" represents 40, 50, or 60 aircraft, depending on nationality. The main difference is that there will be several standardized sizes (maybe squadrons, groups, and wings). [As I once pointed out in ETO, the current system, with Soviet "groups" of 60 aircraft per counter, makes them 50% more efficient than the Germans in their ability to base aircraft -- probably not the intended effect.] >We also figured that the temptation to treat a named counter like its >real counterpart would be very strong for us researchers and that >complicates things immensly as everybody moved things around in units >that don't match up well with Europa conventions Would this cause such substantial strength changes as to require too many re-organizations? (*Not* a rhetorical question: I'm ignorant. But would the necessary abstractions be excessive in comparison with the sort of abstractions already made in representing ground units?) I realize that I'm asking for two separate things that might work against each other: stylistic consistency and a simplified air system. >I think that individual ships and aircraft types were added for flavor as >generic "points" are seriously bland. I think rolling a dozen dice to (maybe) break a rail hex or put a hit on a port is seriously bland, too. I *love* looking at the air counters when I get a new game, but I really get tired of playing out the air phase when exciting things are happening on the battlefield. I admit I'm not an air aficionado. (Jason: Thanks for addressing the issue.) - Bobby. Date: Tue, 19 Mar 96 08:27:22 +0100 From: peterlj@smab.se (Peter Ljungberg) Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be) >Bobby: >>Ray: >>Also examine the farcical experience of the Allies in Norway. > >Since the Allies were supposedly at sea at the same time as the Germans, I >wonder if they had intelligence about German intentions and were trying to >beat them to the draw. Was Ultra available that early? Not Ultra, but old Winston in action. The allies had decided to lay mines in the northern Norwegian shiping channels, and it was for this action that they were at sea, actually laying the mines before the German invasion. In addition, the brits were going to occupy a couple of Norwegian ports - I guess protection from the Germans was going to be the excuse, the real reson being, of course, to stop the Swedish iron ore. They were not aware of the German invasion when planning this, they basically got to know about Weserubung only after it started. I have always wondered what would have happened if the Brits had beaten the Germans to Norway. Who would the Norwegians have fought - the limeys or the Krauts? How would, for example, the US have reacted to a British invasion? Tricky thing to model in GE... Peter From: Roberth Lundin Subject: RE: The Fall of France (to be or not to be) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 10:54:21 +-100 > IMO, Norway and Sweden were much more important than most people > seem to relaize because whoever controls Norway dictates where the > Swedes send their iron ore. If the Germans are defeated in Norway than > the economic repercussions are immense as the Swedes ship their iron > to the UK rather than to the Germans. > The Swedes were practical folk; they would pay attention to whoever > could yell the loudest and ownership of Norway and the general progress > of the war were the two sources of loudness as the Swedes realized that > an amphibious invasion of Sweden wasn't a viable threat, especially if the > Allies were ensconsed in Oslo. Sweden was very active on the diplomatic arena. Take for example that during the war Sweden got about 30-40 ships through German blockade and Allied blockade, for vital supplies. A Swedish diplomat spoke about as a miracle that both warring parties could agree to this. Robbox Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 13:07:03 +0100 From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling) Subject: Narvik (Was: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)) >IMO, Norway and Sweden were much more important than most people seem to >relaize because whoever controls Norway dictates where the Swedes send >their iron ore. If the Germans are defeated in Norway than the economic >repercussions are immense as the Swedes ship their iron to the UK rather >than to the Germans. Wrong! I've been discussing this issue with several persons lately, and I found out that this is wrong on several points. First, contrary to popular belief, Narvik wasn't that all important to the mines in the Kiruna area. The ore could be shipped just as easily from Lulea. Lulea freezes, but the ore trains could have taken the long trip to Gothenburg during winter. It would have been more expensive, but it could have been done. Second, only half of the Swedish ore came from the Kiruna-mines at the time! The rest came from the Bergslagen area in central Sweden. This ore was definitely not transported via Narvik. More likely via Stockholm. I'm not sure whether ice-breakers kept the port in Stockholm open in winter or not, but I would guess that they did. Otherwise, this ore probably went through Gothenburg in winter. Third, the Bergslagen-ore was actually of a much higher quality than the phosphor contaminated Kiruna-ore. It was the Bergslagen ore that the Germans used for gun-barrels and such. So, if Narvik was occupied by the allies, the Germans would be denied the less-important half of the Swedish ore for a third of the year until alternative transportation routes had been worked out, which wouldn't have taken long. Talk of an inefficient blockade! The control of Narvik could possibly have allowed the allies to outbid the Germans for the Kiruna-ore (since transports would have been more expensive to Germany, during winters, at least). But then, there's a strong possibility that the Swedes would have reacted so strongly to an allied invasion of Norway that they would have refused to sell the ore to them. This may sound strange. After all, they were selling the ore to the Germans after they had invaded Norway. But then, Sweden was in no position to react. And, in 39-40, Sweden was by no means pro-allied. Mvh Elias Nordling o-noreli@jmk.su.se Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 08:34:50 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: Narvik & Iron Ore >First, contrary to popular belief, Narvik wasn't that all important to the >mines in the Kiruna area. The ore could be shipped just as easily from >Lulea. Lulea freezes, but the ore trains could have taken the long trip to >Gothenburg during winter. It would have been more expensive, but it could >have been done. Sure, it could have and probably would have been done as an expedient. However, doing this would have disrupted Sweden's rail system, tying up capacity and track time for the ore trains from the north. By itself, this would have disrupted the Swedish economy, so the Swedes would have been reluctant to allow this without compensation from the Germans. Thus, loss of Narvik would have meant delays and higher costs to the Germans -- not crippling, but burdensome nonetheless. Also, the Allies goal was not just the capture of Narvik, see next comment... >So, if Narvik was occupied by the allies, the Germans would be denied the >less-important half of the Swedish ore for a third of the year until >alternative transportation routes had been worked out, which wouldn't have >taken long. Talk of an inefficient blockade! The Allies goal was not just to invade Norway and take Narvik, but to invade Sweden and seize the iron ore mines. Presumably an outraged Sweden would allow a German expeditionary force to help force out the Allies, and presumably the Allies would wreck the mines as much as they could before they withdrew. Narvik in this context is a convenient port of entry to reach the mines. Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 15:54:12 +0100 From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling) Subject: Re: Narvik & Iron Ore >>First, contrary to popular belief, Narvik wasn't that all important to the >>mines in the Kiruna area. The ore could be shipped just as easily from >>Lulea. Lulea freezes, but the ore trains could have taken the long trip to >>Gothenburg during winter. It would have been more expensive, but it could >>have been done. > >Sure, it could have and probably would have been done as an expedient. >However, doing this would have disrupted Sweden's rail system, tying up >capacity and track time for the ore trains from the north. By itself, this >would have disrupted the Swedish economy, so the Swedes would have been >reluctant to allow this without compensation from the Germans. Thus, loss >of Narvik would have meant delays and higher costs to the Germans -- not >crippling, but burdensome nonetheless. Also, the Allies goal was not just >the capture of Narvik, see next comment... I agree that there would be an additional cost, but I'm not sure it would be that burdensome. After all, this would only apply during the months of the year when Lulea was frozen. Also, since this ore was not as important as the Bergslagen ore, a scheme could have been worked out where the ore was stockpiled and shipped when Lulea thawed. This probably would have required additional train capacity as well, but I don't think the cost would be that great. >>So, if Narvik was occupied by the allies, the Germans would be denied the >>less-important half of the Swedish ore for a third of the year until >>alternative transportation routes had been worked out, which wouldn't have >>taken long. Talk of an inefficient blockade! > >The Allies goal was not just to invade Norway and take Narvik, but to >invade Sweden and seize the iron ore mines. Presumably an outraged Sweden >would allow a German expeditionary force to help force out the Allies, and >presumably the Allies would wreck the mines as much as they could before >they withdrew. Narvik in this context is a convenient port of entry to >reach the mines. Yes, of course. As I understand it, the allies actually expected to be let into Sweden to occupy the mines! Given the size and shape of the allied expeditionary force and the amount of Swedish troops in the area, it is entirely possible that the Swedes could have kept the allies from the mines without German help. And still, this is the less important mines. The mines in Bergslagen are out of reach for the allies under all circumstances. Mvh Elias Nordling o-noreli@jmk.su.se From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue) Subject: Ultra in Spring, 1940 Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 10:45:03 -0500 (EST) Hi, Bobby Bryant wrote: > Since the Allies were supposedly at sea [in April] at the same time as the Germans, I > wonder if they had intelligence about German intentions and were trying to > beat them to the draw. Was Ultra available that early? > I don't remember when the Ultra designation went into effect, but it wasn't that early. However what became known as Ultra was sporadically available in April, 1940, but was not put to good use at the time. Hinsley's "British Intelligence in the Second World War" describes the problems with British intelligence at that time. To the state the obvious (but rarely considered), three things are needed for effective operational intelligence: (1) The information must be reliable. (2) The information must be rapidly disseminated to those who can make use of it. (3) Those who are to make use of the information must trust the source. During the invasion of Norway, reliable information was available to the British on a sporadic basis. For example, that the Ark Royal (or whichever aircraft carrier which was sunk) was going to be attacked was known to someone in British intelligence before it happened. However, effective routines for letting the right people in the Royal Navy know this rapidly had not yet been developed. Even when commanders did get information from "Ultra" in 1940, it was rarely believed, as the source was secret. During the invasion of France, the British were still having trouble with (2) and (3). But, according to Weinberg in "A World at Arms", the Germans were probably reading Allied codes and making effective use of what they read during the campaign. Unfortunately, the German files on their code breaking in the Second World War which are held by the US and the UK are still closed. So, this is only informed conjecture on Weinberg's part. Best Wishes, Keith Pardue Kingston, Ontario, Canada From: Jeff White Subject: Re: Second Front end game Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 11:16:32 -0600 (CST) Stefan Farrelly Said: > > My brother and I have played many SF scenarios and weve never had a problem > with not enough Air RP's, despite in one game deliberatly trying to hit the > Axis air to see if we coould impact their RP's long term. No good. > > Consequently we think the Air RP's are too generous for all sides. As I recall (correct me if I'm wrong here), air replacements do not accumulate from one phase to the next. We didn't catch this at first. This makes a big deal. We did manage a couple of times to get the Krauts weak in air force with many months to recover. -- Jeff White, ARS N0POY jwhite@ghq.com "I am Pentium of Borg. Arithmetic is irrelevant. Prepare to be approximated." Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 13:47:01 -0500 From: Ray Kanarr Subject: Re: Gas Warfare To update my earlier post, which included info on U.S. preparations for gas warfare: December 2, 1943, Bari, Italy: During the night of Dec. 2-3, 88 [or 30, depending on the source] bombers of Luftflotte 2 made a low-level attack on harbor installations and shipping at Bari. One or two [depending on source] munitions ships explode, contributing to the sinking of 17 or 18 ships [the source citing 18 also cites a tonnage of 71566 tons shipping/38000 tons cargo, and so may be more reliable]. More than 1000 people are killed and over 800 injured. The connection with the above topic is this: one of the ships, the SS John Harvey, was carrying a cargo including mustard gas shells, which were apparently broken open by the destruction. As mustard gas is actually a volatile oil, it created slicks on the surface of the harbor before vaporizing, leading to a much greater loss of life among the ships crews than would otherwise have been the case, particularly as the initial symptoms, burns and pulmonary distress, were masked by fire burns and smoke inhalation injuries, which prevented early diagnosis and treatment. Although I found several sources for this, the two most informative were Rohwer & Hummelchen's *Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45* and Christopher Argyle's *Chronology of World War II*. Note that it wasn't until the fifth book that I checked that I was able to find a reference to Bari, and therefore found the date of the attack [it wasn't even referenced in CWS, and neither was the ship name of the cargo ship carrying the gas, an unusual lack in CWS] and was unable to find references in any of the books under Chemical, Gas, or Poison. I'm also told that there is a book out dealing with the Bari attack specifically, possibly called *Incident at Bari* but I wasn't able to find out more than that. Ray From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue) Subject: Re: Gas Warfare (fwd) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 13:14:29 -0500 (EST) Hi > Although I found several sources for this, the two most informative > were Rohwer & Hummelchen's *Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45* and > Christopher Argyle's *Chronology of World War II*. Note that it wasn't > until the fifth book that I checked that I was able to find a > reference to Bari, and therefore found the date of the attack [it > wasn't even referenced in CWS, and neither was the ship name of the > cargo ship carrying the gas, an unusual lack in CWS] and was unable > to find references in any of the books under Chemical, Gas, or > Poison. I'm also told that there is a book out dealing with the Bari > attack specifically, possibly called *Incident at Bari* but I wasn't > able to find out more than that. > > Ray > > There is a reference to this book in a footnote in Weinberg's "A World at Arms." I'm afraid that I don't have it handy. As I mentioned once before, Weinberg's book is an excellent guide to the scholarly literature on World War II. It has hundreds of pages of footnotes and a lengthy bibliographic essay. The text is rather slight on operational detail, but he is covering all of WWII in one (thick) volume! In the text he concentrates on strategy and politics, with some sections on technology, civilians, and the social impact of the war. Best Wishes, Keith Pardue Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 15:57:15 -0500 From: Ray Kanarr Subject: Re: Gas Warfare On 3/19/96, Keith Pardue sent: >There is a reference to this book in a footnote in >Weinberg's "A World at Arms." I'm afraid that I don't have it >handy. Thanks for the assist, Keith. As Weinberg's book is the only one I do happen to have handy here, the following additional info comes to light: The book is actually titled *Disaster at Bari*, by Glenn Infield, Macmillan, NY, 1971. The SS John Harvey was carrying 100 tons of mustard gas shells! Ray Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 12:22:57 -0800 From: bstone@sub.sonic.net (Bill Stone) Subject: Re: Gas Warfare Ray Kanarr wrote: > >I'm also told that there is a book out dealing with the Bari >attack specifically, possibly called *Incident at Bari* but I wasn't >able to find out more than that. Infield, Glenn. DISASTER AT BARI. New York: Macmillan, 1971. Out of print, but in the used book market this has been offered by Military History Bookshop, World War II Books, and Eastern Front/Warfield in the last few months. ---------------------------- Bill Stone Santa Rosa, CA bstone@sonic.net World War II Web Site: http://www.sonic.net/~bstone ---------------------------- Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 13:06:53 -0800 From: bstone@sub.sonic.net (Bill Stone) Subject: Re: Ultra in Spring, 1940 Bobby Bryant wrote: > > Since the Allies were supposedly at sea [in April] at the same time as the > Germans, I > wonder if they had intelligence about German intentions and were trying to > beat them to the draw. Was Ultra available that early? Hinsley, F. H. BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: ITS INFLUENCE ON STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS, volume one. London: HMSO, 1979. "Intelligence had little influence on the origin and evolution of the plans for British intervention [in Norway]." [p 120] Hinsley notes that some intelligence of German moves came from non-ULTRA sources (air recon, diplomatic reports) but was misinterpreted or ignored. "...[the Admiralty] did not firmly conclude that an invasion of Norway was in progress until, early on 9 April, reports came in of the German landings...." [p 124] "The Germans achieved total surprise by their invasion of Norway." [p 127] Also of interest: "...the project for cutting off Germany's supplies [of iron ore from Sweden] originated in ministerial pressure, mainly from Mr. Churchill. Thereafter, MEW [Ministry of Economic Warfare] took the view that the stoppage of only the Narvik route would produce only limited embarrassment for Germany, the implication being that, to be effective, action would have to extend to the seizure of the Swedish orefields." [p 120-121] ---------------------------- Bill Stone Santa Rosa, CA bstone@sonic.net World War II Web Site: http://www.sonic.net/~bstone ---------------------------- From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 09:19 GMT Subject: One day at Bari One of the greatest poison gas incidents of the war was the Luftwaffe raid on the Italian port of Bari, in December, 1943. This late-afternoon strike by a squadron of Wolfram von Richtofen's Ju-188s caught the American defenders by surprise, and German ordnance did its usual job of pasting Allied merchant shipping, and destroying much of the harbor. But a routine air raid -- painful enough -- turned to horror when bombs tore apart the American merchant ship SS John Harvey, turning her into a floating torch that drifted through the harbor before exploding, with no survivors. After the strike, people in Bari began smelling garlic, and wrongly assumed it was due to Italian cooking. Far from it. The John Harvey held a secret cargo of mustard gas bombs for artillery and mortars, to be used as retaliation against potential German attacks. The harbormaster did not know the gas was there. By morning, the British and New Zealand field hospitals were packed with hordes of civilian and military victims, who were complaining of burning eyes and skin...and died quickly. Baffled British doctors wrote down, "Not yet diagnosed (Sclerosis)" on their cards and begged for help. A British army doctor was sent to investigate, and he determined the cause of the disaster was the John Harvey's unknown cargo. The damage to the port slowed down the Allied offensive in Italy, but also left behind scores of poison gas victims. (I'm writing this mostly from memory, because my books on Bari are at home, I'm afraid) David H. Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand From: Jeff White Subject: Re: SF Game report Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 16:54:53 -0600 (CST) Rich Velay Said: > > Hi Jeff. > I was interested in your game report. I have a > couple of questions though... > > >>The Brits fried the Achen sector then proceeded > >>to overrun a 4-6-6 Inf XX in a major city hex (figure out > >>that stack....) > > Hmm, *I* can't. Let's say we use the 17-10, the 16-10 > and a 8-7-8 Art Grp, that's 24.5 Att factors. Next we use > the 5-3-6 Arm Aslt Eng, the 5-3-10 Arm Eng and the 4-3-10 > Arm Eng, that's 19 Att Factors (43.5 total) and then use > both Cdn 6-8 Art Xs, for 12 Att factors. That's a total of > 55.5 Att factors versus a major city hex. Even if the 17-10 > NZ are there, letting the 17-10 Arm XX BD, the 11-10 Arm X > participate, I can't come up with more than 57 Att factors. > Or maybe I am misunderstanding, and this wasn't a solely > British/CW stack? It was a combo stack. I don't recall the exact stack, but it was something like: 12-10 Arm XX (Fr) 6 14-10 Arm XX (Br) 7 8-7-8 Art XX (Br) 8 5-3-6 Arm Aslt Eng X 10 5-3-10 Eng Tank X 5 2-1-8 Sieg Art II (US) 4 2-1-8 Sieg Art II (US) 4 2-1-8 Sieg Art II (US) 4 2-1-8 Sieg Art II (US) 4 2-1-8 Sieg Art II (US) 4 2-1-8 Sieg Art II (US) 4 60 > Anyway, I'd be very interested to see the units > involved, since my game is coming around to D-Day and as the > Axis, I have to guard against such things. > > > >>Then they overran a 9 point 5-7-6 Inf XX and 1-2-6 Inf X. > >>We nicknamed the 90 point stack, Devestator. > > Again, I'm curious about this overrun as well. The best > I can come up with, using CW units, is a 17-10, two 15-10's, > an 11-10, a 9-10, a 7-10 and two 6-8 Art. That seems to max > out at 86 Att factors. Again, was this a purely CW stack? > Or perhaps were you using variable overruns? Essentially, but we substituted two American 8-6-8 Art X for two Can 6-8 Art X. We used normal overruns and the Allied co-operation rule. So, this was a highly intentional maneuver. > Regardless, as per above, I'd love to see this spelled > out for me, to aid in my defence of the Homeland... :) > > >>The Americans ended up with about 300 Inf replacements > >>banked up, and 200+ Armor replacements. > > Wow, considering they only get 368 Inf and 382 Arm, > that's incredible. You guys must have really shut down the > Axis counter attacks and not taken many exchanges. Very > impressive. The Germans made, I think, 5 attacks. Three were successful, one caused a DR to no effect. One DH'ed a Brit Inf Div. One EX a weak Brit/Can stack chasing the Krauts across France. The Americans were dishing it out on the West Wall with HX and EX's but they also generated special replacements. Oh from other things like converting AA X's to trucks. I got to be very good at the "perfect" amphib attack. One that cannot go wrong and the Krauts cant blow you off the beach with a cheap DR. I'm working on an article on how to do it. Also mind you, our opponent is a, IMHO, a world class Europa player. Bill Stromberg, aka Uncle Joe. Uncle Joe is an expert at playing, as you can guess from a nick name like that, the Russians. He can do defense like no other. Turn after turn, Charlie and I (my partner) we do terrible damage to the German situation. We would figure there is no way they can recover, he would pull a rabbit out of his hat. He had a fairly cunning strategy of keeping casualities low. Going on the theory that we (the allies) can blow away any stack we can get three hexes on, he would put a non-overrunable stack, say 7 points, in front of a bigger stack save the big stack from being eaten and slow us down. We never managed, until the end a serious rupture from ground attacks. Only from the air or by sea. > In my current game, as of Mar I '44, the Allies are in > not near as good shape. They have about half the repls they > could possibly have to this point and have had to send US > Arm to the Brits and others. > > >>The Brits had a bit over 60 Inf replacements banked up. > > Again, wow. And they only get 101 Inf through May '45. > I'm glad my Axis weren't playing your Allies. Good show. > The combat phase must have been very kind to you. Not really. We made an early decision to "try to spin things out of control". The theory is that if the Germans get pressed too hard with breakthroughs, amphibs, etc, they will get wiped out quicker. So, we made *quality* attackes versus *quantity*. We also avoided EX or HX's with the Brits. With an opponent like Uncle Joe, we should have been doing quanitity attacks. Up until the West Wall, about 80% of our attacks were at 7:1 or better. We had a lot of poor die rolls. I think we hit Dolph (20-10 Arm XX) and a 3-2-10 Aslt Gun X across a river at 9:1 several times for just DR's. We had mud as soon as possible in 44 and one turn after it was possible in 43. Lot of punted die rolls. Uncle Joe was good at the 2/3'rd chance of a DR and living. Never got to use the mulberries. Never had calm seas in the Atlantic after Aug I 44 (when we needed them), ever. How's that for miserable luck? Here's a good one. We landed in France on (I think) Feb I 44. Winter weather the turn we landed. Mud on the next turn. No temp airbases. No air cover (South of France, near the Spanish border) for a month, had to build permanent airbases. And my all time favorite, we had a 5/6th chance to break a 14 point stack in Italy (with no cadres) across a river (on the Adriatic) side, on a road, with no ZOC next to it, and run 8 or so hexes North, running down about four units and breaking things wide open. The attack fumbled on a 1. Near the end we switched to 5:1 and 4:1 type attacks. We made something like 24 attacks at one point (all against fairly large stacks). > > Fascinating stuff, Jeff. It's always interesting to > hear how things are going in other games. Thanks for > posting this. late/R > Here's a bonus. My all time favorite cheesy manuever. We airlifted the Brit 2-1-R LR Art II with the heavy glider. ]:) Oh, and while I'm at it, I think the most powerful unit in the entire game, without question is the 12-8 Mar XX (US) (given the current rules). With three of them, the Krauts would be in MAJOR trouble. Why? 1) They land without LC's (Amphibious). 2) They land supported and support units stacked with them (div). 3) They are only halved on the attack (Amphibious). 4) They can overrun units on the beach with some help of a couple more units (Div supports units during movement, which fleets can't do). 5) They have ZOC's which keep enemy units from getting a reaction move who are next to them. 6) They stack well for a naval assault (hard to get divs to land). 7) Which means 2 more planes per div and up to 8 more points of fleet support versus a 1RE unit. 8) They have flak (allied Div) to help keep DAS away. 9) They are big and nasty. (Enough said). -- Jeff White, ARS N0POY jwhite@ghq.com "I am Pentium of Borg. Arithmetic is irrelevant. Prepare to be approximated." Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 18:06:57 -0600 From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant) Subject: Re: Narvik & Iron Ore John said: >The Allies goal was not just to invade Norway and take Narvik, but to >invade Sweden and seize the iron ore mines. Presumably an outraged Sweden >would allow a German expeditionary force to help force out the Allies, and >presumably the Allies would wreck the mines as much as they could before >they withdrew. Narvik in this context is a convenient port of entry to >reach the mines. Is Sweden the only source of the ore in Eurasia? Could the Germans not have gotten it from the USSR so long as they maintained a pact? Would the Allies have to blockade the still-neutral Italy and the Balkan nations to ensure that Germany did not get ore through a middle man? - Bobby. Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 18:23:49 -0600 From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant) Subject: Re: Gas Warfare (book reference) Ray wrote: >... I'm also told that there is a book out dealing with the Bari >attack specifically, possibly called *Incident at Bari* but I wasn't >able to find out more than that. I see a _Disaster_at_Bari_ by Glenn Infield in our online card catalog. Library of Congress call number 945.09 IN3D. No subject information is listed. - Bobby. From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 12:35 GMT Subject: Japan and the Jews I got asked, and I forget who by, about the book "Desperate Voyagers" on the Japanese and the Jews in WW2. The authors are Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz, it was also entitled "the Fugu Plan," and was published in 1979 by Dell Press in paperback. David H. Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 19:57:39 -0500 (EST) From: Edward K Nam Subject: Re: GE and Russia On Tue, 19 Mar 1996, Bobby D. Bryant wrote: > Is Sweden the only source of the ore in Eurasia? Could the Germans not have > gotten it from the USSR so long as they maintained a pact? Would the Allies > have to blockade the still-neutral Italy and the Balkan nations to ensure > that Germany did not get ore through a middle man? > This raises and interesting question that I've had for a while regarding Russia and Germany. I've read that Stalin and Hitler had no love for each other before the war even when they feigned friendliness to split the spoils of war. There was even a letter from Stalin to hitler congratulating him on his successful conquest of France! But if Hitler never invaded Russia everyone always says that Stalin would have invaded Germany. Have there ever been papers found implying that Stalin was preparing for an invasion? It certainly wasn't true in 1941? I've played a few strategic level wargames where I as the Germans decide to hold off or cancel the invasion of Russia in order to get other prizes like Spain, North Africa, and British Middle East (Sweden and Turkey even) where other raw materials could be found. But those games, and I fear GE too, had Soviet economies based on a '41 invasion even if there was no invasion. So what happened is that a HUGE Soviet military was built up just asking for trouble, and placed on the Polish border. This is probably a difficult question to answer, but would Russia have manufactured and produced such an incredible army without the fear of invasion? History would seem to say that Russians fight hardest on their own soil, they are more often defenders than aggressors. (but I'll admit that don't know that much about Russian history). On the flip side of all this, it is easy to play a wargame and say that you should "never get involved in a land war in Asia". Of course, Hitler and his generals thought that the Russians would be almost as easy to defeat as France. And what good is GE without Fire in the East? (grin) -------------------------------------------------------- On another note, re: gas warfare. I have the Times Atlas of WWII which states that gas was used to clear the tunnels and trenches in Sevastopol in the closing days of the siege (no reference cited), though I looked in Seaton and I didn't find it there. -Ed From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 13:13 GMT Subject: Re: Gas Warfare (book reference I have the book "Disaster at Bari," by Glenn Infield, copyright 1968 or thereabouts, here with me in NZ. It's a fairly detailed account of the John Harvey fiasco, replete with detailed medical reports on some of the victims and the pathology of the cases. British and New Zealand doctors were pretty puzzled until they found out it was mustard gas. I'll bring it in and provide more dope from it as soon as I can. Right now I'm dealing with a newsletter, my book, another newsletter, and Alfried Rosenberg (of all people). Dave Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand Date: 19 Mar 96 20:18:53 EST From: Alan Philson <100626.2267@compuserve.com> Subject: Re: Fall of France, British participation Paul Smith wrote: >Although I have no basis in history for what I'm about to say, in virtually ALL >strategic type WWII games I've played, the fall of France can be prevented (or >at least majorly delayed) if the British chooses to commit heavily to its >defense. In GE, I can see this as a valid choice the British player can make. >He can choose to risk home defense for the defense of France. After all, the >best defense of the British homeland is a France still in the war. In fact Britain did commit heavily to the defence of France, everything that was combat ready was sent, even after Dunkirk divisions were still being shipped to France and the intention was to refit those divisions evacuated at Dunkirk and return them to France. These plans were knocked on the head by the rapid deterioration of the military situation when the Germans resumed their southward advance. From memory the FoF British OB does not go beyond July but a in typical FoF game France can last till the Autumn so there should be additional British units available for France up to this time. However even in GE I can not imagine that the allied player will be allowed to strip the British garrison as It should reflect the uncertanties of the time. Invasion was considered a serious possibility even before the French campaign to the extent of preparing East coast ports for demolition, substantial forces were retained in the UK against that contingency. With the Dutch and Belgian coasts under German control it is inconceivable even in GE that the player will be allowed to expose Britain to invasion by sending these forces to prop up France. Besides in GE a forward thinking German player might have the option to build LCs in which case the British player will look pretty silly with his army in France while the Germans sail up the Thames. Alan Philson From: m.royer3@genie.com Date: Wed, 20 Mar 96 04:29:00 UTC 0000 Subject: Re: East Africa Reply: Item #0471906 from PSMITH@FTW.MOT.COM@INET#on 96/03/18 at 12:44 Paul Smith, I'd recommend pulling out the old S&T version of Africa Orientale and playing it once or twice. Its an interesting little game, and a different twist on typical Europa. I enjoyed it. I too would like to see a standard Europa scale Africa Orientale (again, probably without linking maps to WiTD. -MarkR. Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 23:02:33 -0600 From: conrad alan b Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be) On Tue, 19 Mar 1996, Jason Long wrote: > IMO, Norway and Sweden were much more important than most people seem to > relaize because whoever controls Norway dictates where the Swedes send > their iron ore. If the Germans are defeated in Norway than the economic > repercussions are immense as the Swedes ship their iron to the UK rather > than to the Germans. > The Swedes were practical folk; they would pay attention to whoever could > yell the loudest and ownership of Norway and the general progress of the > war were the two sources of loudness as the Swedes realized that an > amphibious invasion of Sweden wasn't a viable threat, especially if the > Allies were ensconsed in Oslo. > > Jason > There is an interesting point I've never heard anyone bring up before. There is a rail line in Sweden that runs from the area of the Iron ore fields down toward the Baltic. I can't remember if it is on the Europa maps. I looked into the situation some years ago since I wondered if the Allies took or shut off Narvik, but did not actually violate Swedish territory, could the Germans still get their ore over this line. I could come up with no definitive answer. I didn't know if the rail line ran all year? Or if the Baltic freezing up could keep that line from being effective? Perhaps one of our Swedish Europa people can shed some light on this. Secondly, just because the Britsh have southern Norway I would put little faith in that letting them dominate the region. Once the Luftwaffe gets into Denmark they will rule the area and with all of Sweden faceing the Skagerak or the German dominated Baltic I don't think they would change their tune. At least until '42-'43. Alan Conrad Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 00:33:17 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: RE: The Fall of France (to be or not to be) The Swedes did a marvelous job of balancing the competing demands of both sides during the war. They could not risk upsetting either party so much that they would embargo the Swedes, much less invade. The importance of the iron ore gave them some maneuvering room with the Germans, but they needed German coke and coal almost as much since the Allies couldn't suppply their needs unless they owned Norway, or at least a major port or two. The more I look into the economic inter-dependence between Germany and Sweden, the more convinced I am the whole Mediterranean campaign was a mistake. If Hitler hadn't overreacted to the Torch landings so extremely the Germans would have gotten out relatively lightly. The collapse of Italy doesn't hurt the Germans much at all. I went into some of the benefits of a Scandinavian campaign in my notes to Arctic Thunderbolt so won't repeat myself here. But this new economic info I've been gathering further emphasizes my point. Jason Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 00:44:04 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: Re: Narvik (Was: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)) On Tue, 19 Mar 1996, Elias Nordling wrote: > >IMO, Norway and Sweden were much more important than most people seem to > >relaize because whoever controls Norway dictates where the Swedes send > >their iron ore. If the Germans are defeated in Norway than the economic > >repercussions are immense as the Swedes ship their iron to the UK rather > >than to the Germans. > > Wrong! I've been discussing this issue with several persons lately, and I > found out that this is wrong on several points. > > First, contrary to popular belief, Narvik wasn't that all important to the > mines in the Kiruna area. The ore could be shipped just as easily from > Lulea. Lulea freezes, but the ore trains could have taken the long trip to > Gothenburg during winter. It would have been more expensive, but it could > have been done. The Swedes greatly expanded the capacity of their North Baltic ports during the war so that the damage inflicted on Narvik had little overall effect on Swedish iron ore deliveries. So far as I've been able to determine the southern ports don't seem to have been used much in the iron ore traffic. Perhaps a lack of the proper type of handling equipment? I don't know. There alos seems to be a shortage of RR cars to carry the ore itself so that the Swedes couldn't move the same tonnages over a longer distance. > Second, only half of the Swedish ore came from the Kiruna-mines at the > time! The rest came from the Bergslagen area in central Sweden. This ore > was definitely not transported via Narvik. More likely via Stockholm. I'm > not sure whether ice-breakers kept the port in Stockholm open in winter or > not, but I would guess that they did. Otherwise, this ore probably went > through Gothenburg in winter. > > Third, the Bergslagen-ore was actually of a much higher quality than the > phosphor contaminated Kiruna-ore. It was the Bergslagen ore that the > Germans used for gun-barrels and such. > > So, if Narvik was occupied by the allies, the Germans would be denied the > less-important half of the Swedish ore for a third of the year until > alternative transportation routes had been worked out, which wouldn't have > taken long. Talk of an inefficient blockade! > > The control of Narvik could possibly have allowed the allies to outbid the > Germans for the Kiruna-ore (since transports would have been more expensive > to Germany, during winters, at least). But then, there's a strong > possibility that the Swedes would have reacted so strongly to an allied > invasion of Norway that they would have refused to sell the ore to them. > This may sound strange. After all, they were selling the ore to the Germans > after they had invaded Norway. But then, Sweden was in no position to > react. And, in 39-40, Sweden was by no means pro-allied. Actually I'm thinking more in the 1942-43 period. I'll tentatively agree that the retention of Narvik does little to persuade the Swedes not to sell to the Germans since the Germans are still in position to invade Sweden through southern Norway. If the Allies can remove that threat by evicting the Germans then the Swedes have little choice but to sell to the Allies and there's not much the Germans can do about it. And that could be decisive. Jason PS I have tonnage figures for the ports by year and I'll try to post them early next week when I come back on line. Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 23:18:39 -0600 From: conrad alan b Subject: Re: Howling about Alan's post. On Tue, 19 Mar 1996, Jason Long wrote: > We've had discussions over the years about actually using unit > designations on air counters, but have always been frustrated by the fact > that the US and UK just really can't be straight-jacketed into 40 > airplane counters as the US fighter groups had about 75 airplanes and the > Brits had wings that comprised between 3 and 5 squadrons of fighters, but > they didn't use enough for each counter and only used the wing to > control fighters, not for bombers. Some RAF bomber squadrons were almost big > enough to be a counter by themselves. > Contrarily, the Germans fit the standard almost exactly until they add a > fourth staffel to some of their fighter gruppen. > > Jason > Except that it is not the TO&E but the number of aircraft actually operational that counts. Yes a gruppe is supposed to be 40 a/c. But when researching this some time ago I found out that during the Battle of Britain most of the units involved only average about 25 a/c operational. This worked out all right in a game I was then designing since the British were using 12 plane squadrons. So I could use 24 plane gruppen for the Germans and it worked. And just as the British during that battle had more planes and pilots to keep the squadron fighting at a 12 plane clip, later on the Americans would take off extra a/c to fill out any unit that might have planes that had mechanical problems and flew in group stength of 48 a/c. Out of a TO&E of maybe 75 a/c. So compare that to the Germans, that to my knowledge were seldomly able to get Luftwaffe units up to proper stength at any time throughout the war. So how one wants to try to figure that into the Europa system is not entirely clear to me. Alan Conrad Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 01:15:09 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: Re: Narvik & Iron Ore Swedish iron ore was the richest in Eurasia so far as I know. This had several advantages in that less coke and coal was consumed and labor used per ton of iron as well as needing less cargo space. Based on my prelimary research the Germans may have made a serious error in developing their domestic very low-grade (Salzgitter) ore so intensively because it required so much extra resources and manpower to smelt that it was probably not cost effective. The Swedes would not have cut the Germans off in the 1940-41 period unless the Allies control all of Norway and can offer a shield against the Germans. So I feel that Churchill's scheme was really a chimera, with no real hope of being realized before 1942, barring serious German screw-ups. Jason