ZION QUARTERLY - lst quarter 1993

A publication of Christian Friends of Israel

 THE INTIFADA:  FIVE YEARS AFTER

 "The Philistine said, "I defy the ranks of Israel this day." When Saul and all
Israel heard these words of the Philistine, they were dismayed and greatly
afraid." (1 Samuel 17:10,11)

 Five years have passed, but for most Israelis the terrible images remain vivid:
tens of thousands of angry Palestinians rampaging through the streets of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, undeterred by the mighty Israeli army. The earthquake
that shook Israel and brought world attention to the Palestinian cause became
known as the intifada, the shaking off. The Palestinians were shaking off
Israeli rule.

In a matter of days, the intifada changed the nature and complexion of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arabs, who had been utterly humiliated in five wars
against Israel, were able to accomplish with stones what they could not
accomplish with tanks and warplanes. The intifada created havoc in one of
Israel's most prized institutions, the army; it sowed fear into the hearts of
Israelis; and it transformed Israel from the underdog to the aggressor in the
all-important battle for world opinion. For the first time, Israel was forced to
deal with the Palestinian issue and with the future of the territories.
Ultimately, the intifada forced Israel to the negotiating table.

Today, the intifada is continuing away from the spotlight. For Palestinians, it
is keeping their dream of independence of alive; for Israelis, it is a time bomb
they fear could explode again.

 WILDFIRE

The intifada began routinely enough. An Israeli truck and a car carrying
laborers from the Gaza Strip collided, leaving four Palestinians dead. But
instead of becoming another statistic, the accident lit the fuse of the
uprising. Rumors spread quickly throughout Gaza that the truck hit the Arab car
intentionally, and severe rioting broke out at the Jebalya refugee camp.
Thousands of people turned the streets into a virtual war zone, attacking
soldiers with stones and molotov cocktails, burning tires, and setting up
barricades.

The riots were not the first in the Strip, and the Israelis were under the
impression that they would peter out, as they always had in the past. As a
result, the Defense Ministry denied a request from Southern Command for
reinforcements, and on top of it, then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin flew
merrily off to the US as if nothing was happening. With Israel's top ranking
defense official 6,000 miles across the sea, mass rioting spread throughout
Gaza, to Judea and Samaria (i.e. the West Bank), and finally, to Jerusalem. The
territories were on fire, and the Israeli army and the Israeli government were
unprepared, ill-equipped, and unable to deal with it.

There is no question that had the army brought in massive reinforcements,
imposed curfews, and cracked down hard on Gaza during the first few days of
unrest, the intifada would have been nipped in the bud. Instead, it spread like
wildfire, giving the Palestinians a new sense of strength, and Israel a new
sense of weakness. The Israeli army, once a source of fear and deterrence to the
Palestinians, was now a target of mockery. And by challenging heavily armed
soldiers with stones, the Palestinians became the heroes of the Western media,
and in turn, public opinion. With the daily pictures of soldiers shooting and
beating civilians, and Palestinian casualties mounting, Israel was branded an
oppressor state.

 RIPE FOR AN EARTHQUAKE

Although the intifada took Israel by surprise it shouldn't have; it had been
simmering under the surface for some time before it finally exploded on December
9th, 1987. The Palestinians had been getting bolder, and the Israelis were
appearing more and more weak, and afraid. Several months before the intifada
broke out an army officer was shot dead as he drove down the main street of
Gaza, and soon afterward, Israeli employees of the Civil Administration (i.e.
the military government in the territories) began traveling to work in convoys
and avoiding the main roads. Civilian and military officials from the
Administration also made it a point to get out of Gaza before dark. This was not
lost on the Palestinians, who saw it as a sign of cowardice and retreat.

There was also festering anger, frustration, and resentment among the
Palestinians, especially in the refugee camps which became the focal points of
the intifada. The camps-filthy, polluted, unpaved, and overcrowded slums-were
for the Palestinians a daily reminder of a plight they believed was imposed on
them by Israel. This sentiment was aggravated by the realities of life under
military rule, especially in Gaza. Arab workers were sometimes held up for hours
at military checkpoints, and most Palestinians had been detained at one time or
another during army sweeps following terrorist attacks. Palestinians were
offended by this treatment, and felt humiliated.

Israel has no alternative but to take severe measures, including sweeps,
arrests, and checkpoints, because of the threat of Arab terrorism. But this
atmosphere of mutual suspicion, of terrorism and counter-terrorism, made the
overcrowded and impoverished Gaza Strip ripe ground for an earthquake.

 THE UNIFIED COMMAND AND HAMAS

While the intifada began as a totally spontaneous and grassroots movement,
Palestinian groups immediately seized the initiative to bring some kind of order
and direction to it. Two organizations took control of the intifada, the secular
PLO, and the Moslem fundamentalist movement Hamas. Various factions within the
PLO formed a clandestine command called the Unified National Leadership of the
Uprising." This command achieved remarkable success in controlling the
population, although most Palestinians had no idea who the leaders were. Its
main form of communication with the public was through weekly leaflets, which
declared strike days and incited the people to participate in violent
demonstrations. Among the general rules were a boycott of Israeli products, a
daily strike allowing stores and businesses to open only three hours a day,
general strikes about twice a week which shut down all businesses and
transportation, and a halt to all celebrations and entertainment (in solidarity
with Arab "martyrs" and prisoners). While the strikes initially made a point to
both Israel and the world, ultimately, they destroyed the Palestinian economy.

The intifada rules were enforced by groups of youths called "shock committees."
Shopkeepers and businessmen who failed to abide by the limited work hours were
threatened or beaten, and their stores or businesses torched. Needless to say,
it was not long before the strikes were universally observed.

Hamas, which had a much smaller following than the PLO in the West Bank, but
which was strong in Gaza, developed a similar set of intifada rules; the main
difference was that its leaflets called on the population to return to Islam,
and to work for the establishment of a Moslem, and not a secular state. The PLO
and Hamas have vied for leadership of the uprising, and at times, this rivalry
has turned violent.

 REIGN OF TERROR

Today, the intifada has largely changed from a popular revolt by the Palestinian
masses, to a terrorist campaign by armed and ruthless Palestinian gangs. These
hooligans have seized control of the streets in the territories, and imposed a
reign of terror on their fellow Arabs, as well as carrying out attacks on
Israeli soldiers and civilians. While Palestinian leaders now admit that the
gangs are out of control, it is they who created the monster which is now
consuming the intifada. The seeds of lawlessness were planted early on, when the
Unified Leadership imposed its will on the population through the shock
committees; anyone not towing the line was punished with Mafia-style force.

Although the shock committees first targeted strike breakers, they quickly
turned their attention to people they considered far more
dangerous-collaborators, those Arabs who informed to the Israeli authorities. In
the beginning, the committees used beatings and destruction of property as the
principal methods of intimidation; during the first year of the intifada only 18
Palestinians were killed as alleged informers.

But gradually the killings increased, until they became the distinguishing
characteristic of the uprising. The statistics bear it out, that over the past
two years more Palestinians have been killed by their own brothers than by
Israeli soldiers. The PLO in Tunis, the Unified Leadership, and Hamas initially
sanctioned the killings, and their hit men carried out the executions with
wanton brutality. People were dragged out of their homes in the middle of the
night or in broad daylight, and murdered on the street, often as relatives
looked on. Parents were killed in front of their children, children were killed
in front of their parents, teachers were killed in front of their students. Some
victims were shot, some hacked to death with axes, some beaten to a pulp, some
slashed with knives, some ripped limb from limb, some burned and tortured, all
dumped in public places as a message to the local population.

Eventually, the definition of a collaborator was loosened to include people
considered a bad influence on society, such as drug dealers and prostitutes.
People were labeled as collaborators simply because they worked in a government
school or hospital, or for the Civil Administration.

It soon became clear that many innocent people were being killed who had no
connection at all to Israel. What happened is that thugs and criminals began
hitching a ride on the wave of lawlessness spreading through the territories.
Many people were killed during robberies, or for failing to pay extortion money,
or to settle scores. It became common for hoodlums to kill someone, and after
the deed, to scrawl the word "collaborator" on the wall.

 OUT OF CONTROL

The killings were out of control, and everyone, including the Palestinians, knew
it. Nevertheless, it was not until about a year and a half ago, that
Palestinians began publicly condemning the phenomenon. Until then, criticism of
the intifada was taboo, and Palestinian figures no doubt feared that if they
condemned the killings, they, too, would be labeled collaborators, and suffer
the same fate.

But when the silence became so deafening-and embarrassing-Palestinians finally
began speaking out. "The nightmare of fear dogs us all," wrote Palestinian
journalist Adnan Damari. "We are afraid of ourselves, of our
dream-turned-nightmare. The god-demon which we have created and worshipped, and
which has turned on us, is the intifada."

About a year later, in June 1992, Palestinian leaders affiliated with the PLO
imposed an official ban on the killings, and said violators would be reprimanded
and then ostracized by the community. The ban is to give the people, the masses,
a sense of security," said Palestinian activist Said Kanaan. "The killings are
unethical, brutal and unacceptable, and besides, most of the victims were
innocent."

Despite the ban, the killings have continued apace, and in 1992, nearly 200
Palestinians were murdered by their own people, mostly in the Gaza Strip. This
is not only a sign that the gangs are out of control, but also that there is a
big gap between the youths who rule the streets, and the moderate Palestinian
leadership involved in peace talks with Israel. While these leaders do have the
support of a broad sector of Palestinian society, many young PLO radicals regard
them as armchair activists divorced from the plight of the people, and
especially the refugees. In addition, Hamas has no regard for decisions made by
the PLO-affiliated leadership, and it neither joined the ban on the killings,
nor even condemned them.

 KNIVES AND GUNS

While the terrorist groups have directed most of their wrath at fellow
Palestinians, Hamas, in particular, has also mounted a brutal campaign against
Israeli civilians. These attacks-mostly random, cold-blooded stabbings-have
often coincided with events in the peace process, like visits by former US
Secretary of State James Baker, or the beginning of a new round of peace talks.
Such unmitigated acts of terror are clearly an attempt by Moslem extremists to
torpedo the peace talks.

The stabbings are every bit as disturbing to Israelis as were the mass
demonstrations of the early intifada, possibly more so. The riots took place in
Israel's backyard so to speak; they were something Israelis watched on TV, but
which, for the most part, did not directly touch their lives. The terrorist
attacks, on the other hand, took place right on Israel's doorstep, inside the
pre-1967 borders, in sovereign, undisputed Israeli territory. They happened
everywhere, at bus stops, on buses, in the middle of busy streets, in quiet
suburbs, in factories, in broad daylight. Almost always, the attacker shouted
the Moslem slogan "Allah Hu Akbar" ("God is great") as he cut people to ribbons.
Teenage girls as well as old men and women were among the victims. These
attacks, which came in waves, shook the nation, and made Israelis wonder if
anywhere in the country was really safe. They also created an atmosphere of
extreme suspicion-Israelis began to feel that any Arab, at any time, could
become a knife wielding terrorist.

Hamas has also stepped up attacks on Israeli soldiers, and the use of firearms
has increased dramatically. Just before the fifth anniversary of the intifada,
Hamas gunmen ambushed an Israeli patrol in Gaza, killing three soldiers. A few
days later, one soldier was killed and two wounded in a similar ambush in the
West Bank town of Hebron. A day after that, Hamas kidnapped a paramilitary
border policeman in the heart of Israel, and later killed him.

 UNDERCOVER AND UNEQUIPPED

Neutralizing the armed terrorist groups is now the army's primary objective in
its war against the intifada. Its most effective weapon is the use of special
undercover units-highly trained soldiers, often disguised as Arabs, who have
changed the rules of the game in the territories. These units have sown fear and
confusion among the Arab gangs, since any Palestinian on the street could turn
out to be an armed Israeli agent. As one military official put it, "The
terrorists no longer know who their friends are, and who are their enemies."
Undercover squads have killed a large number of wanted Palestinians, captured
many more, and others, fearing for their lives, have turned themselves in.

These units have been Israel's most successful tool in dealing with the
intifada, because the army is far better equipped to deal with armed terrorists
than with a mass civil rebellion. To this day, Israeli soldiers are poorly
equipped to deal with violent demonstrations; the average soldier in the
territories carries an assault rifle, but not a baton, nor a shield, nor a gas
mask (to protect him from the effects of tear gas). While the army has developed
many non-lethal techniques to quell riots, most have been ineffective, if not
absurd. It developed rubber bullets, plastic bullets, sand bullets, and salt
bullets, and to give the Palestinians a taste of their own medicine, a gravel
thrower which fires tiny stones at demonstrators.

The army also suffers from unclear and unfair orders, which have put soldiers in
a dilemma. In an attempt to reduce casualties, the army issued orders which
basically protect Palestinians: the rules of engagement allow a Palestinian to
fire a weapon, or even throw a grenade, before an Israeli soldier can open fire.
Many soldiers have been killed unnecessarily, simply because wanted terrorists
were allowed to open fire first. Others, who did open fire, have been put on
trial. As a result, soldiers are extremely reluctant to use their weapons, even
in life threatening situations. In the early months of the intifada, then
Defense Minister Rabin ordered soldiers to break Palestinians' bones, but some
who did were court-martialled. Some of the army's best commanders, who
instructed their men to carry out these orders, were dismissed from their posts
or put on trial.

 FORCED TO NEGOTIATE

One of the most significant achievements of the intifada is that this no win
situation ultimately forced Israel to the negotiating table. If not for the
intifada, Israel would probably have been content with the status quo forever;
the status of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza would have remained undefined. Israel
hadn't annexed the territories, because adding a million and a half Palestinians
to a country of 4 million Jews, would create a demographic time bomb. At the
same time, Israel wasn't in any hurry to give the territories up, because they
provide security, natural resources, and cheap Arab labor, not to mention Jewish
heritage.

But when the intifada erupted, Israel was confronted with the Palestinian
problem head on. And as the violence continued there was a growing chorus of
voices, that "there is no military solution to the intifada, only a political
one." Those who subscribed to this view included cabinet ministers from the
Labor party (then a partner with the Likud in the National Unity Government) and
leading army commanders, including the chief of staff. While the Likud resented
this, its government, nevertheless, was not able to quell the intifada.

With the Labor Party now in power, the "no military solution just a political
one" slogan has been repeated again and again, especially after the sharp rise
in Hamas terrorism in December. Some of Israel's ultra-dovish cabinet ministers
went much further, calling for a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. While Gaza is
a terrible place, and a horrendous burden, such declarations obviously give
encouragement to the terrorists. Why should terrorist groups stop their attacks,
if Israel doesn't have a military answer? And why should the Palestinian
"moderates" at the peace talks in Washington even bother to negotiate? If Hamas
can get the Israelis to consider withdrawal from Gaza by killing a few soldiers,
why not expand the armed struggle, and get Israel to start talking about a
unilateral withdrawal from Judea and Samaria as well?

 APPEASEMENT OR IRON FIST?

Today, the intifada is terrorism, pure and simple. And while shooting stone
throwers poses a moral dilemma, crushing terrorism should not. Terrorism is a
declaration of war, and Israel can either respond with military measures, and
fight to win, or surrender. The political solution slogan, especially following
terrorist attacks, is surrender. Since Israel does not have capital punishment,
and since Moslem fanatics want to be martyrs anyway, the most effective means of
dealing with intifada terrorism is deportation. Nothing scares Palestinians more
than being dumped into Lebanon, without family, without a home, without money,
without anything.

The sharp upsurge in terrorism in December, forced even the leftist Rabin
government to act, and in a shocking move, it deported 415 Moslem
fundamentalists, the biggest peacetime expulsion of Arabs in the history of the
Jewish state. It was a tremendous blow, and a far more powerful deterrent than
anything done by any Israeli government since the beginning of the intifada.
Until the deportations, the Rabin government followed a policy of appeasement.
For example, Israeli prisons are full of convicted terrorists and murderers who
sit in their cells relaxing with daily newspapers and watching TV. Recently,
these prisoners demanded special antennas from the government-and received
them-so they could watch TV broadcasts not only from Israel, but also from
Egypt, Jordan and Syria! This policy made Israeli deterrence a travesty, and
Palestinian extremists understood it as an invitation to step up terrorist
attacks.

 FUNDAMENTALISM AND MODERATION

If the intifada made Israelis more open to a negotiated settlement, it did the
same to Palestinians. Eventually, the Palestinians realized that stones would
not force the Israeli army to withdraw from the territories. This, along with
the hardships created by the intifada-the curfews, the casualties, the strikes,
the increasing violence and lawlessness-lead many Palestinians to believe that
the only way to a solution was through negotiations. With the backing of world
opinion, and a sympathetic Bush administration, the Palestinians decided that
the peace process might be able to give them what wars, and even the intifada,
could not. "The intifada is basically on a slow back burner," says Palestinian
journalist Daoud Kuttab. "It is keeping the Palestinians' dream of freedom and
self-determination alive, but it's not the main force now for Palestinian
independence-it's the peace talks."

The longer the peace talks fail to make progress, however, the more the
radicalization of the Palestinian street, and the more pressure on the PLO to
pull the delegation out of the negotiations. While recent polls show that a
majority of Palestinians support the peace process, Moslem fundamentalism is a
growing challenge to Palestinian moderation. Palestinian observers attribute the
strength of Hamas, and the increasing violence in the territories, to
frustration. '"There have been no tangible results out of the peace process,"
says Kuttab, "and so some Palestinians think that by violence and using
firearms, the Israelis might be willing to do what they have been unwilling to
do as a result of moderation. The radical groups, the Islamic groups, are
growing, not because they offer something better, but because the existing
leadership is unable to deliver to the people," he says. "The end result of this
will be that the moderate Palestinian leadership will not lose the streets, but
will move closer and closer to the radical position, so as to stay in touch with
what the people seem to be saying they want."

 AT A CROSSROADS

But even if the moderate Palestinian leadership could deliver, Islam will no
doubt continue to spread in the territories, as it is throughout the Middle
East. The Islamic groups regard a negotiated settlement with Israel as heresy,
and therefore, they will continue to do everything within their power to destroy
the peace process.

The Israeli government has vowed that it will not allow terrorism to kill the
peace process, and that it will remain engaged with the Palestinian delegation
while conducting a full scale war against Hamas and other terrorist groups. But
in the end, terrorism may force the Palestinians, and not the Israelis, to pull
out. The growing violence and radicalization in the territories is widely
interpreted as a message to the Palestinian leadership that its mandate in the
peace process is limited, and that people are running out of patience.
Therefore, every terrorist attack puts the Palestinian delegation under more
pressure to bring results, and fast. At the same time, increased terrorism will
lead to drastic Israeli countermeasures, which will put severe pressure on the
Palestinians to pull out of the peace talks in protest. Palestinian negotiators
cannot allow themselves to be viewed by the radicals as turning a blind eye to
Israeli repression"; nor will they want to hear accusations that the peace talks
have only brought more hardship on residents of the territories.

The intifada, therefore, is at a crossroads. For the Palestinians, it can remain
the symbol of resistance which forced Israel to the negotiating table; or it can
force the Palestinians to abandon the negotiations and return to the armed
struggle. For Israel, it can remain a time bomb which only a negotiated
settlement can dismantle; or it can force a military crackdown that will
dismantle the peace talks.

 By ROBERT FRANKLIN Jerusalem, Israel

 "The Lord who delivered me from the paw of the lion and from the paw of the
bear, He will deliver me from the hand of this Philistine." (1 Samuel 17:37)